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INTRODUCTION
Opinions do not generate in a vacuum; they are the
product of thoughts which have sifted down from many
sources.

One important contributor to this influx of

ideas has been the historian.

But even while the importance

of his role is acknowledged, his effects are not always
readily calculable, and it is sometimes difficult to dis
cern whether a better understanding of past events has had
any significance in shaping men's responses to contempo
rary issues.

It is the thesis of this paper that there

have been certain situations when historical research had
an important bearing on the choices statesmen made and
the policies they pursued.

This will be illustrated by

focusing on a group of historiane known as revisionists
and analyzing the impact of their work on one particular
event, Britain's reaction to the remilitarization of the
Rhineland.
Called revisionists because they reached conclusions
at variance with previously accepted versions of the First
World War, these men helped to alter the entire scheme of
values and beliefs concerning Anglo-German relations
during the inter-war period.

Their new explanations for

the causes of the war pervaded the intellectual climate
1

2

of the twenties and thirties and became an integral part
of the body of ideas that nurtured the British philosophy
of appeasement.

Furthermore, the evidence they uncovered

did much to predispose officials and public opinion in
favor of pro-German alterations to the Treaty of Versailles.

CHAPTER I
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
When the First World War divided Europe into two
antagonistic camps, it aroused passions which made attempts
to analyze the origins of such a dreadful catastrophe almost
impossible.

One has only to glance at some of the eighty

seven issues of the OXford Pamphlets, published in 1914 and
1915, to learn the accepted British position on all aspects
of the war.

Another source for revealing each country's

official version of its entry into the war was found in
what were termed "color books" pUblished at the outset of
the fighting, containing carefully selected
the foreign offices.

docu~ents

from

Not too surprisingly, the British

Blue Book and the French Yellow Book arrived at similar
conclusions: the Germans were guIlty.

Even historical

writing to emerge during the war and immediately after
sustained this standard interpretation, and one of the most
influential was produced by J. W. Headlam (later Headlam
Morley), historical advisor to the British Foreign Office. 1
In his book, Headlam recounted the immediate events

1James Wycliff Headlam The History of Twelve Days:
July 24~ to August 4~, 1914, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd.,
1915).
3

4

leading to hostilities and no significant challenges to
this version appeared until the opening of the foreign
office archives.
After the return to peace, memoirs of political and
military leaders involved in the war or the years leading
up to it began to emerge, lending added credence to many
of Headlam's positions.

The publication of works by well

known figures, such as Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and
former Foreign Minister and the President of the French
Republic Raymond Poincare~ continued to maintain Germany's
guilt, while discounting the importance of most of the new
documentary evidence to appear since 1918. 2
But in spite of the array of information criticizing
Germany, the fighting was hardly over, indeed, the Treaty
itself barely concluded, when many of these interpretations
began to undergo severe scrutiny and eventual attack by some
of the most respected historians in England and abroad.
There were a number of reasons for this rapid change, and
the historical writing that occurred as a result was
referred to as revisionist.
One of the stimulations to further research was the
vast propaganda effort of the Germans, carried out with

2Herbert Henry Asquith, The Genesis of the War, (New
York: George H. Doran Co., 1923), ~p. 246-279; Raymond
Poincare, The Origins of the War, {London: Cassell and Co.
Ltd., 1922).

5

efficiency and effectiveness in the years immediately after
the Peace Conference.

Largely in response to Article 231 of

the Versailles Treaty, or what came to be known as the "war
guilt clause," the German Foreign Office set up a special
section--the Kriegsschuldreferat--to do research on the
origins of the war in order to dispute this charge.

Alfred

von Wegerer, an ex-army officer, was given money to launch
the periodical Kriegsschuldfrage (War-Guilt Question), and
it soon became an influential journal, publishing many of
the early revisionists along with any information or docu
ments favorable to the German case. 3
What exactly was this German propaganda effort directed
against?

The six volume study of the History of the Peace

Conference, edited by Harold Temperley, presents a detailed
account of the armistice and Treaty of Versailles, empha
sizing those portions which gave rise to so much distress
and bitterness in Germany.4

There was no issue that engen

dered more controversy, however, than that of reparations,
and it soon came to overshadow all other considerations.
3Martin Gilbert, ~he Roots of Appeasement, (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 23.
4Harold William Temperley, ed., A History of the
Peace Conference: ~e Settlement With Germa ,Vol. II of
History of the Peace Conference
vols., ondon: Henry
Froude, Hodder and stoughton, 1920), pp. 41-43. Also see
Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations, ~ondon: Ernest
Benn Ltd., 1927).

\ 6
In order to insure that once the Peace Cbnference had
ended, legal means would exist for enforcing German payment
for the cost of the war as well as for the damages to ci
vilian,~

life and property, the Allies carefully worded Articles

231 and 232 in the reparations section of the Treaty to
cover both a moral and a legal obligation. 5

As Temperley

analyzed them, the first of these two clauses (Article 231)
" ••• asserts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies
for causing all the loss and damage suffered by her enemies
as a result of the War.

This responsibility is a moral and

not a financial responsibility."6
was Article 232 which stipUlated

On the other hand, it
It • • •

the extent to which

any debtor can be made financially respmnsible is limited
by his ability to pay •••• ,,7
It should be noted that at no time did the Entente
Powers intend for Articles 231 and 232 to be a statement

5Article 231 as quoted in Temperley, A History of
the Peace Conference, II., p. 45 reads:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and
her allies for causing all the loss and damage to
which the Allied and Associated Governments and
their nationals have been subjected as a conse
quence of the war imposed upon them by the
aggression of Germany and her allies.
6Ibid ., p. 75.
7 Ibid •

7
of "war guilt. T1

Only later, when the Germans attempted to

build a propaganda case to discredit the Versailles Treaty,
did the articles take on such a connotation.

As the

historian Rajo Holborn has shown in his discussion of
these two articles, when they were written there was not
the slightest reason to assume that the word "aggression"
meant anything more than legal liability.

To the contrary:

We have good evidence that the Big Four, when
putting Articles 231-2 into final shape, did not
mention war guilt at all. Rather, they were
almost exclusively concerned with the practical
application of the Lansing note •••• Only the
German's feverish conviction that the treaty
was bound to contain a statement on Germanyt s
8
sole war guilt made them seize upon Article 231.
Germany's sense of injustice, whether valid or
fabricated regarding this clause, was further inflamed by
the Allies' refusal to negotiate any of the Treaty's
provisions.

Instead, their delegation to the Conference

was given an opportunity to make observations on the docu
ment and then present them to the Allied and Associated
Powers.

In return, they received the Allies' reply which

not only verified the severity of the Treaty's terms,
but reaffirmed Germany's belief that Article 231 was a
declaration of guilt with the statement that:

8 Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germa
Vol. III of A History of Modern Germa~y'~
~
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 564-565.

1840-1945,
ew York:

8

Germany being responsible for the war and for the
'savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted'
bad committed 'the greatest crime against humanity
and tbe freedom of peoples that any nation, calling
itself civilized has ever consciously committed. '9
Although active resistance to the Treaty was impracti
cal after the defeated nation had been disarmed, two other
alternatives could be pursued: one would be to adhere to
passive resistance whenever possible; the other would be
to refute what bad popularly come to be termed the moral
basis of the Treaty.

By proving that their country had

not been solely responsible for initiating the war,
Germany could undermine a critical reason for imposing
many of its most detested provisions.

In the attainment

of this second aim, the Reich engaged in a tremendous
propaganda effort which had a significant impact on the
bistorical writing of the post-war era.

Immediately after

the war, in an effort to clear their nation of the impu
tation of guilt, they opened up files, records, foreign
office documents, and memoranda to historians.

According

to an article by Cbarles Beard analyzing current histori
ography about the war, the availability of tbese sources
altered the traditional rule tbat normally tbe generation
wbo fought a war knew little about it because diplomatic

9Temperley, The History of the Peace Conference, II.,
p. 11.

9
archives usually are not opened for fifty to one hundred
years. 10 General access to German, Austrian, and also
Russian documents, made available after the Communist
Revolution in order to discredit the Czarist regime, offered
historians unprecendented opportunity for critical study
of the years leading up to the war.

The German propaganda

effort also stimulated historians into reexamining the
entire German "case," for its veracity.

While in the

process of this research, some men uncovered evidence which
impelled them either to modify or contradict earlier
assumptions about the responsibility for the war, and they
became known as revisionists.
But this term, when applied to an entire group, can
be misleading; consequently, as used in this thesis,
revisionist will include any historian who varied from the
accepted or official position as espoused so lucidly in
Headlam's book The Twelve Days, or in the government
documents collected in the "color books."

Within this

broad spectrum, there are various differences, ranging
from those who offered only minor discrepancies, to those
who challenged all prior assumptions.

It is important to

note, however, that no matter how slight the difference,
any admission of liability by the Entente or lessening of

10Charles Beard, "Heroes and Villains of the World
War," Current History, XXIV (August, 1926), pp. 730-735.

gUilt on the part of Germany was a victory for the German
propaganda effort because it threw doubt upon the validity
of the Treaty and undermined its moral base.
Three historians who suggested only moderate revision,
George Peabody Gooch, Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, and Pierre
Renouvin, tended to agree that although the Central Powers
were blameworthy, they were not alone in creating war;
moreover, Austria was as much at fault as Germany or perhaps
even more so.

Gooch, author of numerous books on European

and British history, as well as co-editor with Harold
Temperley, of the British Documents on the Origins of the
War. 1898-1914, occupied an influential position among
British historians.

In 1923, Gooch and A. W. Ward edited

Volume III of The Cambridge History of Foreign Policy, 1866
1919, at which time they began to admit some division of
accountability between Austria and Germany.11

Four years

later Gooch published an important work, Recent Revelations
of European Diplomacy, reviewing a large body of material
relating to the origins of the war.

He interspersed

throughout this book the thesis that no one nation was
inherently evil; rather all acted as might be expected
under the circumstances.
11

And after studying each country

A. W. Ward and George Peabody Gooch, eds., The
Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1866-19~
Vol. III of The Cambrid e Histor of British Forei n Polic ,
1783-1919, (3 vols., New York: MacMillan Co., 1923 •

11
objectively, he showed that no

~

participant was gUilty

of wanting or producing war.

If anything, all had been
12
shortsighted in folluwing such inept policies.
An American historian, Bernadotte Everly Schmitt,

was also engaged in studying the reasons for the war.
Although his two volume work, The Coming of the War, 1914,
did not appear until 1930, he was among the earliest
historians to begin scrutinizing the issue of German
"war gUilt.,,13

While admitting that Germany's legal

accountability stemmed from the act of declaring war,
Schmitt also introduced the questions of political and
moral liability as considerations.

But he disagreed with

certain revisionists like Harry Elmer Barnes who construed
the new documents being brought to public attention as
sufficient evidence for clearing Germany completely of any
hand in initiating the war. 14 Throughout the 1920's,
Schmitt continued to devote his energy to the task of
presenting his own thesis in various periodicals or

12George Peabody Gooch, Recent Revelations of European
(London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927),
pp. 206- 07,213.

Diplomac~,

13Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, The comi~ of the War,
1914, (2 vols., New York: Charles Scribners ~ns, 1930).
14Bernadotte Everly' Schmitt, "A Distinguished American
Historian Ap~ortions the War Guilt," Current History, XXIII
(March, 1920), pp. 796-803.

12
reviewing works by other historians. 15

And in these arti

cles, Schmitt restated the idea that once Europe had sepa
rated into armed camps due to the alliance system, war
became unavoidable in 1914:
••• because then, for the first time, the lines
were sharply drawn between the two rival groups,
and neither could yield on the Serbian issue
without seeing the balance pass definitely to
the other side.16
In France, as well as England and America, historians
were also reviewing official interpretations about the war;
and Pierre Renouvin was one of those who succe.eded admirably
in his goal of making an objective examination of the en
tire problem.

In his book, Renouvin concentrated mainly

on the crisis occurring between June 28 and August 4, 1914;
but even more than had Gooch or Schmitt, he emphasized
German responsibility.17

Renouvin also stressed the need

for making an objective analysis, carefully defining, in
one essay, the role of the historian.

It was " •.• not to

fix responsibilities but rather to furnish explanations

15:Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, "July, 1914,11 Foreign
Affairs, V (October, 1926), pp. 132-147; "Where Does the
Guilt Lie?" The Saturday Review of Literature, III (November
20, 1926), pp. 311-312; "Diplomatic Europe,~ The Saturday
Review of Literature, V (March 2, 1929), pp. 721 T 726; "The
Origins of the War," The Journal of Modern History, I
(March, 1929), pp. 112-119.
16:Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, "Triple Alliance and
Triple Entente, 1902-1914," American Historical Review,
XXIX (April, 1924), pp. 449-473.
17Pierre Renouvin The Immediate Origins of the War,
28 ili June-4 ili August 1914~, trans. Theodore Carswell Hume,
New Haven: Yale Onlversity Press, 1928), pp. 10-11,35-37,
40-41,333-334,342.

13
and to make clear the circumstances which guided the
development of international policies.,,18
Moderate revisionists Sidney Bradshaw Fay, Alfred
Fabre-Luce, and Mary Edith Durham all tried to distribute
the blame more evenly among the major powers than had
their conservative counterparts Gooch, Schmitt, and
Renouvin.

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson and Alcide Ebray

shifted the emphasis away from blaming anyone nation or
group of nations; instead, they condemned the system of
alliances for producing a situation of international
anarchy--the real culprit.
Perhaps the most well-known among the moderate
revisionists, and certainly one of the earliest to start
questioning the
Fay.

Il

war guilt" verdict, was Sidney ill:.'adshaw

In the July and October 1920 issues of the American

Historical Review, he began to examine earlier premises
relating to the German case, refuting many of the most
widely accepted of them. 19 Fay's ideas received much

18Pierre Renouvin, "How the War Came," Foreign Affairs,
VII (April, 1929), p. 384.
19Sidney Bradshaw Fay, "New Light on the Origins of
the World War, II American Historical Review, XXV (July, 1920),
p. 628; "New Light on the Origins of the \var, II, Berl in and
Vienna, July 29 to 31, 'T The American Historical Review, XXVI
(October, 1920), pp. 52-53; "New Light on the Origins of the
War, III, Russia and the Other Powers," The American Historical
Review, XXVI (January, 1921), pp. 250-251.

14
notice and attracted interest throughout the decade as he
continued pUblishing additional information further sub
20
Then in 1928, Fay's ~o
stantiating his earlier views.
volume work on The Origins of the War appeared, uniting all
of these arguments and others into an extended analysis of
both the long range and immediate causes.

Within each

volume, Fay explicitly stressed the didactic nature of his
work and called for a revision of the Versailles verdict
which he said was historically unsound:
One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles
Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely
responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors
from vanquished, under the influence of the
blindness, ignorance, hatred and propagandist
misconceptions to which war has given rise.21
In the first volume, emphasizing the long range issues
leading to conflict, Fay implicated all of the major powers
to some degree.

He classified these issues under the system

of secret alliances, militarism, nationalism, economic imperi
alism, and the press.

Each contributed to a poisoning of

the atmosphere between nations and a heightening of tensions

20Sidney Bradshaw Fay, "Serbia's Responsibility for
the World War," Current History, XXIII (October, 1925), pp.
41-48; "Who Started the War?" The New Republic, XLV (January
6, 1926), pp. 185-186, "Serajevo Pifteen Years After," The
Living Age, CCCXXXVI \ July, 1929), pp. 374- 379; "Pre-War
Diplomacy and the Press,1l current History, XXXIII (November,
1930), pp. 212-217.
21Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War,
Vol. II of The Origins of the World War, (2 vols., 2nd. ed.,
New York: MacMillan Co., 1928), pp. 548-549.

15
which could only conclude in a war.

In addition, Fay

recognized one special situation--conflict in the Balkans-
as another long range cause, because it was " ••• most nearly
incapable of a peaceful solution. 1122 The second volume of
the work examined immediate events, and here Fay appeared
far more critical of individual nations, apportioning to
Austria the largest share of the blame, and characterizing
Germany as a victim of her alliance with the Dual Monarchy
whom she needed as her one dependable ally.2 3 Fay did
suggest that Germany had erred first by cutting off ties
with Russia in 1890 and later by giving Austria a blank
check on the eve of war.
Mary Edith Durham, haVing carefully studied the tense
Balkan situation, agreed with Fay's conclusions regarding
Serbia's role in the crisis.

She first published her

findings, justifying the Austrian Ultimatum, in 1923.

She

considered the note an appropriate response to the Archduke's
assassination in the face of Serbian complicity in the
entire plot, coupled with their refusal to allow Austrian
officials to participate in the search for the criminals. 24
22 Ibid., Vol. I., p. 546.
23 Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 553-554.
24Mary Edith Durham, "Croatia and Greater Serbia,"
Contemporary Review, CXXIX (November, 1923), pp. 595-597;
"Fresh Light on Serbia and the War," Contemporary Review,
CXXIV (September, 1928), p. 304.

16
Five years later Miss Durham finished The Serajevo Crime,
detailing the activity of the Greater Sebian
the way back to 1782. 25

movernen~

all

Another supporter of divided responsibility, the
Frenchman Alfred Fabre-Luce, made no secret of the motives
for writing his book.

Troubled over France's failure to

realize the fruits of Victory, he argued that peace could
only be termed successful for his country if it prevented
a new war.

But this could not happen until the truth
26
about the origins of the last war were told.
Rather tban seek to censure anyone power or group
as other revisionists had tried to do, Goldsworthy Lowes
Dickinson preferred to view war as a product of tbe inter
national system of anarchy.

Insisting that " ••• the anarchy

of armed States defeats the good intentions of tbe most
admirable men,,,27 Dickinson portrayed international re
lations in the period before 1914 as a circle of inter
connected facts. 28 Hopefully, he wrote in the preface to
his book, once people recognized the inherent dangers in
the balance of power system as it existed prior to the war,

25Mary Edith Durham, The Serajevo Crime, (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1925), pp. 12-15.
26Alfred Fabre-Lues, The Limitations of Victory, trans.
Constance Vesey, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 201-204.
27Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy,
1904-1914, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1926), p. 36.
28±bid., p. 46.

17
they would work to alter this structure.

Thus, like so

many of the revisionists, Dickinson intended his work to
serve as an historical lesson and a guide to world peace.
Alcide Ebray!s book proposed a thesis similar to
Dickinson's.

There was no "guilty party," first, because

responsibility was divided, and second, because the war was
unavoidable since everyone did what it was only natural he
should do. 29 Ebray was particularly harsh on France,
condemning her for being
Russia to take up

It • • •

l ess energetic in urging

conciliatory attitude than Germany was
in her similar advice to Austria.,,3 0 Also, like Dickinson,
~

Ebray hoped his book would establish the truth in order to
promote reconciliation between the powers and thereby
introduce a truly stable Europe.

Ebray explicitly attacked

the Treaty because it did not conform to historical evi
dence as he perceived it, and he called for its revision
as the first step in making peace a reality.31
Almost immediately after the armistice was signed,
the German government began work on presenting their
version of the causes for the war.

It was the Versailles

29Alcide Ebray, A Frenchman Looks at the Peace, trans.
E. W. Dickes, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. xxi.
30 Ibid., p. 19.
31 ___
'd
Ib 1_.,
pp.

"i"1.
.
X1-X1
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Treaty, however, that gave a focus and direction to this
effort, as well as attracting historians from other
countries to delve into the entire problem.

A number of

those who claimed to have discovered evidence exonerating
Germany from any share in bringing about the war have been
termed radical revisionists.

One reason for this is the

sUbjectivity which characterized many of their books and
articles; they made no effort to hide the purpose of their
work--revision of the Treaty.

Beginning with the a priori

assumption that the Versailles Settlement was unfair to
Germany, they sought to prove that it was based on faulty
evidence which could only lead to inaccurate conclusions;
therefore, the Treaty must be changed before a lasting
European peace could be secured.

They also tended to take

the most extreme view in reapportioning the blame for the
war, maintaining German innocence, and portraying her as
a victim of the Entente's maneuverings to impose war upon
the unwitting Central Powers.
Early in the 1920 1 s, numerous articles written by
Germans such as Hans Delbruck, Karl Kautsky, Count Max
Montgelas, and Alfred von Wegerer began appearing in
European and American periodicals.

Along with the presen

tation of new evidence obtained from the recently opened
foreign office documents, whenever possible these men

19
rejected the 'lease" against Germany.32
Additional support for this rehabilitation program
carried on by German writers came from the radical revision
ists led by Harry Elmer Barnes who wrote prodigiously, pro
moting German innocence and disputing all other views. 33
Barnes also published two controversial and one-sided
attacks on the Treaty in which he rated material according
to the degree that it sustained his own position. 34 He
and his supporters ultimately became emeshed in academic
arguments, particularly with Bernadotte Schmitt whom they
referred to as a "salvager," and frequently they devoted
as much attention to discrediting other historians as to

32Hans Delbruck, "Did the Kaiser Want the War?" The
Contemporary Review, CXIX (March, 1921), p. 322; Karl Kautsky,
"Germany Since the War, I' Foreign Affairs, II (December 15,
1922), p. 104; Count Max Montgelas, The Case for the Central
Powers: An 1m eachment of the Versailles Verdict, trans.
Constance Vesey, London: George Al en & Unwin Ltd., 1925),
p. 200; "Letters to the Editor," The Nation and the Athenae~-,
XXXII (October 14, 1922), p. 54; "A French View of War Origins,"
The Nation, CXXI (November 18, 1925), pp. 578-579; Alfred
von Wegerer, A Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt Thesis,
trans. Edwin H. Zeyde, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), pp.
9-10,42-43,189,320-321.
33Harry Elmer Barnes, "Salvaging German War GUilt,"
The New Republic, LXIV (October 22, 1930), pp. 270-273.
34Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War:
An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt, (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1926); In Quest of Truth and Justice,
(N.P.: Published by the National Historical Society, 1928).

20
their own research. 35
In the long run, however, for the prospects of en
forcing the Treaty, the differences between Barnes and
other historians proved less significant than their simi
larities.

Regardless of the amount of revision the events

leading to the war had been subjected to, the fact that
they were open to any revision at all jeopardized attempts
at rebuilding a peace based on the Treaty of Versailles.
Once German propaganda had successfully blurred the legal
and moral distinctions underpinning the reparations
sections of the Settlement it was not difficult for people
to accept the notion that Article 231 implied German guilt.
And the consequence of this tactic was seriously to impair
the authority of the Peace Treaty during the inter-war years.
Before leaving these historians, it must be emphasized
that in the majority of instances they did not intend to
produce this outcome when they began their research.
Nevertheless, the evidence that they uncovered, when it
contradicted earlier theories, could also be used to weaken
the foundations upon which the Treaty had unintentionally
come to rest.

35Harry Elmer Barnes, IIEngland Arraigns Herself,1I The
Nation, CXXV (August 17, 1927), p. 162; C. Raymond Reazley,
liThe Great Reversal,1I The Christian Century, XLIV (June 30,
1927), pp. 805-806; Michael Hermond Cochran, Germany Not
Guilty in 1914, (Boston: The Stratford Co., 1931), pp. 3,12
14,18.

CHAPTER II
REVISIONIST HISTORY BECOMES A POLITICAL FORCE
As historians continued to research the materials
that had become available since the war, many of them un
covered additional discrepancies.

Their findings soon

attracted academic notice which rapidly expanded beyond
these circles to include a widespread audience.

This

chapter will examine the depth to which the revisionists'
ideas permeated Britain's intellectual class and filtered
throughout the rest of society by the end of the twenties.
It will also illustrate how those who sought to weaken the
Treaty were able to seize upon the historians' conclusions
for this purpose.
The Versailles Settlement had hardly been ratified
before it began to be modified: first by the Allies'
abandonment of their demands for the surrender of the
former Emperor and other Germans accused of war crimes, and
next on their attitudes towards reparations and disarmament.

1

Written in circumstances unfavorable to impartial deliber
ation, the completed Treaty was a series of compromises.

Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, From Versailles to Munich,
1918-1938, ed. Harry D. Gideones, Public Policy Pamphlet No.
28, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 3,4.
21

22
Nevertheless, until other alternatives could be found, it
represented the legal foundations of international law for
the signatories.

Germany recognized this and knew the

only means for restoring her position was to discredit
the detested document.
In pursuing that goal, the Weimar Republic did not
find itself alone.

Economists, politicians, diplomats, and

historians from all countries had an interest in changing
certain provisions of the Treaty.

One of the first serious

challenges to this document, occurring even before the final
drafts were signed, came from John Maynard Keynes in
Economic Consequences of the Peace.

By giving a literal

interpretation to the reparations sections, he demonstrated
that, if carried out, the results would be disastrous.

What,

he pondered, could have been the motives of the politicians
who framed such unrealistic provisions?

Three years later,

in another book, Keynes explicitly attacked this

group~

suggesting that all along they had known the Treaty would
be unworkable but had proceeded anyway in any attempt to
satisfy public opinion calling for vengence. 2
But the tangle of reparations did morethan open the
way for criticism of the politicians and the results they

2John Maynard Keynes, A Revision of the Treaty, (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), pp. 9-10,15-16,180.
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produced at Versailles.

Equally important, Keynes' work

began to generate feelings of guilt and sympathy for the
German Republic. 3 There were also a number of other
considerations to reinforce these attitudes.

First,

neither in the economic nor the political sphere had there
been any deep-seated

~radition

of hostility toward Germany.

To the contrary, from the Middle-Ages until the end of the
nineteenth century, France had been England's chief rival
on the continent.

Generally, Germany had been the ally.

Moreover, British business interests were anxious to see
a return of the defeated nation to prosperous conditions.
Finally, the mass of Englishmen did not understand French
fears of a revived Reich. 4 It is not too much to say that
by the mid-1920's, at least in the British popular press,
France rather than Germany had become the villain of
Europe, accused of exploiting the Allied victory for her
own ends. 5
Within this climate of doubt about Allied treatment
of former enemies and mounting sympathy for the anomalous

3Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 62; "Two Appeals
for International Decency," The Nation, CXXII (April 28,
1926), pp. 485-486.
4William Newton Medlicott, British Fbreign POliC~
Since Versailles, (London: Methuen and Co., 1940), pp.-7.
5Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Week-End: A
Social History of Great Britain, 1918-1939, (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1963), p. 155.
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German position, revisionist historians began to publish
their findings.

Many of their conclusions appeared

regu~

larly in the form of articles, book reviews, and letters
to the editor of various periodicals, and began to a~tract
attention to their work. 6 Moreover, disillusionment with
the war and the Peace Treaty had developed an audience
receptive to new explanations of the events precipitating
the catastrophe.

BUt acceptance of these historians did

not depend only upon the mood of the times.

It took the

academic communities' close scrutiny of the evidence to
give their work authority and credence.
In 1924, the editors of Current History organized
a symposium and called it "Assessing the Blame for the
World War."

They submitted an article by Harry Elmer

Barnes to professors of history at well-known universities,
all of whom they considered qualified experts.

The results

indicated that the majority of those questioned supported

6Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, "An Appeal to British
Fair Play," The Nation and the Athenaeum, XXXV (August 30,
1924), pp. 660-661'; George Peabody Gooch, Letter to the
Editor on "The Myth of War-GUilt," The Nation and the
Athenaeum, XXXI (September 16, 1922), p. 193; Max Montgelas,
ItA French V1ew of War Origins," review of The Immediate ~
Origins of the War by Pierre Renouvin, The Natlon, CXXI
(November 18, 1925), pp. 578-579; Kaul Kautsky, f1Germany
Since the War," Foreign Affairs, II (December 15, 1922),
pp. 100-107; Alfred von Wegerer, itA Tragic Scoop: The
Premature Mobilization Report In Germany," The Living Age,
CCCXIV (July 15, 1922), pp. 138-141; "The Evidence Challenged,"
Current History, XXCIII (August, 1928), pp. 810-819;
Also see Chapter I: footnotes ~2,13,14,16,17,18,22,30,31,32,33.
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at least some revisions even if they did not entirely
accept all of Barnes' ideas.

Charles Seymour, from Yale

University. agreed completely with two of Barnes' chief
conclusions: neither Germany nor any other single state
was solely guilty; the disaster had resulted from the
existence in Europe of two armed camps, each suspicious
of the other.

But Seymour did not accept Barnes' assignment

of a relative order of blame to each state.

Much like

Dickinson and other moderates, Seymour said if any in
dictments were to be made, they should be against the
system which permitted the military in each state to
impede pacifistic efforts of the civil leaders.

And in

this instance, not withstanding Barnes, German leaders
had a large share of responsibility for this system. 7
In contrast to Seymour's reservations, G. H.
Blakeslee of Clark University called Barnes' analysis
brilliant.

He suggested that Barnes as well as Fay,

Beard, Schmitt, and Gooch all were in essential agreement
over the following ideas: no government or responsible
statesman worked to bring about a war, and the fundamental
causes were rival alliances, competition for territory,
economic concessions and prestige, mounting materialism,
increased armaments, international suspicions, and fear.

7Charles A. Beard et. al., "Assessing the Blame,"
Gurrent History, XX (June, 1924), pp. 452-453.
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Finally, all acknowledged that the immediate breakdown of
peace was Austria's insistence upon waging war with Serbia
when it was recognized this step could precipitate a
8
general European conflict.
Neither William E. Lingelbach of the University of
Pennsylvania, Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago,
nor Carl Beeker of Cornell University could accept all of
Barnes' thesis; nevertheless, they too extended liability
to all of the major European powers.

But Becker found it

silly and useless either to designate guilt among nations
in any precise order, or among the governments. 9 As Lingelbach
indicated, however,the significance of Barnes' work was
that from the present date, many conventional views of the
10
origins of the war would be subject to revision.
Discussing not only Barnes' position but the degree
to which revisionist theories about the war were generally
approved by 1924, Raymond Leslie Buell, of Harvard University
suggested that the opinions expressed by Barnes as well as
by Fay, Schmitt, and Gboch are "fully accepted by qualified
historians.,,11

In fact, of the nine historians queried,

8 Ibid ., Blakeslee, pp. 458-459.
9Ibid ., Becker, pp. 455-456.
1Plbid., Lingelbach, p. 454.
11

Ibid., Buell, pp. 453-454.
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only A. E. Morse of Princeton University totally disagreed
with Barnes and saw no revision necessary.

He blamed

Germany entirely, seeing her as a continual threat to
European peace prior to World War I. 12
Throughout the twenties and early thirties other
historians added their support to many of the same proposals
advocated by the revisionists.

For example, after evaluating

Barnes' thesis, Charles Beard claimed it had forever
demolished the "Sunday-School theory" that three pure innocent
countries--England, France, and Russia--were suddenly as
saul ted by German and Austrian villains.

On the other hand,

he did reject any attempt by Barnes to whitewash the Kaiser
and his advisors; instead, Beard saw them as men who gave
Austria a free hand with fUll knowledge that such action
might ignite a general conflict.

Yet, he considered the

German leaders no more or less to blame than other statesmen
like Poincare, Grey, or Sazonov. 13

By the end of the decade, a considerable segment of
the academic community had accepted some revision.

When

criticism was made, it usually came from the radicals led
by Barnes who did not feel fellow historians had gone far
enough in shifting the blame from Germany to the Allies.

12 Ibid ., Morse, p. 455.
13Beard, llHeroes and Villains of the World War,"
pp. 730-735.

28
Moreover, men who had written standard accounts of German
actions began to alter their opinions.

One of the most

influential, Harold Temperley, gave favorable reviews to
works by Fay, Schmitt, and Renouvin. 14 And in the same year,
R. B. Mowat wrote an article blaming both the Gentral Powers
and the Entente for failing to reach a rapprochement
throughout the pre-war period. 15
But perhaps the best sign of just how respectable the
revisionist positions had become was illustrated by a confer
ence held at Chatham House in November, 1936, on the topic
of "History T>:ext BOoks as a Factor in International Relations."
In an address to the gathering, Alec Waugh examined the
presentation of the "Great War" in English history books,
and he found:
The pendulum has swung a great deal in the last few
years, and the present tendency--a healthy wish to
let bygones be bygones--is to regard the War as the
general culmination of a certain series of conditions;
and to maintain that to attempt to fix the guilt on
any one nation is as futile as to blame the particu
lar stone in an avalanche which happens to break
one's leg.16

14Harold Temperley, "The Coming of the War," Foreign
Affairs IX (January, 1931), p. 317; "The Archbishop and the
Treaty.~ New Statesman and Nation, III (April 2, 1932), p. 417.
15 R• B. Mowart, "Great Britain and Germany in the Early
Twentieth Century," The English Historical Review, XLVI
( July, 1931), p. 441.
16Alec Waugh, ~History Text Books as a Factor in
International Relations," International Affairs, XV (November,
1936), pp. 888-889.

29
With the revisionists' evidence now incorporated into the
history text, little doubt remains that academic acceptance
of these views had been achieved.
But these interpretations could only gain a widespread
audience and support from the intellectual community if they
were brought to public attention and discussed.

The

journals and periodicals which frequently published articles
analyzing the causes of the war provided the medium for
extending these ideas beyond the historians' sphere.
As early as 1920, an editorial in The Nation openly
called the Treaty vindictive and unenforceable. 17 A year
later, another article suggested:
If Germany did not-a1one dig the pit into which
she and the rest of the world fell, then the
Treaty of Versailles is a lie, its scheme of
annexations and the confiscations breaks down •••• 18
The following year, in The Living Age, a forceful editorial
labeled the whole concept of German guilt a myth.

It claimed

that the main burden for the war fell on Austrian and Russian
official cliques, although Germany was not entirely innocent. 19

17Editorial, liThe Blunder and the War Out," The Nation,
XVI (February 14, 1920), pp. 641-662.
18H• W. M., "The Question of Responsibility," The
Nation and the Athenaeum, XXX (October 29, 1921), p. 173.
19"War Guilt Myths," The Living Age, CCCXV (October
28, 1922), pp. 221-222.
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It also used arguments similar to some of the revisionists'
to propose tbat if the whole body of the Treaty rested on
this myth of German guilt, then,
rotten as tbe superstructure. n20

If • • •

tbe foundation is as

The editorial concluded

by calling for an autboritative study of tbe entire issue
to be carried out not by lawyers but by historians to "open
archives, bear evidence, and form conclus ions. II

21

Words

such as these could only enbance the newly discovered
historical evidence being published.
An article by Emile Cammaerts for the Edinburgh
Review evaluated how far destruction of the "myth" had
progressed by comparing the popular view of the origins of
the war held in 1914 with those held in April, 1925.

For

Great Britain, the major issue--overshadowing all otbers-
bad been the defense of Belgian neutrality; and it symbol
ized the conflict between might versus international
compacts.

But Cammaerts believed that by 1925 the in

vasion of Belgium was no longer thought of as the principal
reason for war but merely a subsidiary issue.

Today, be

concluded, most writers blamed the revival of nationalism
in the Balkans, the break-up of the Dual Monarchy, the
rivalry of interests and armaments between the two groups
of powers struggling for hegemony in Europe as the real

20 Ibid ., p. 221.
21 Ibid ., p. 222.
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reasons for the war. 22

Cammaerts finished his article with

a thrust at the Peace Settlement, tying the question of
blame to its credibility, and suggesting that if the main
moral principle underlying the Treaty was challenged or
changed, there would be a great effect on the diplomatic
structure of Europe. 23 There is little doubt that the contro
versy surrounding Article 231 had become linked to the
revisionists' conclusions whether originally intended by
the historians or not.

Enough of them had explicitly

appealed for a reassessment of the entire question of "war
guilt" to have provided justification for relating the two
issues.

Therefore, when The New Statesman ran an article

measuring the public's desire to re-examine this clause,
it was also partially a measure of the revisionists' impact
upon their times.

The article concluded that by 1925:

There is also, apparently, a not inconsiderable
body of opinion in this country which desires
the question to be reopened with a view to re
lieving Germany of the moral burden of that 'sole'
guilt which she formally admitted in Article 231
of the Treaty of Versailles.24
Other articles followed a similar pattern: they

22Emile Cannnaerts, "War Responsibility in 1914 and
Today," Edinburgh Review, CCXLIV (January, 1925), pp. 39-40.
23 Ibid ., p. 39.
2 4 "Responsibil i ty for the War," The New State"sman,
XXV (October 3, 1925), p. 684.
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presented favorable reviews of revisionists ideas and
assailed the moral premises upon which they saw the Treaty
of Versailles resting.25

One such article, typifying this

process, appeared in T'he Commonweal.

It called for revision

of the Treaty, indicating that a demand for this action was
growing in England and America.

The findings of Sidney B.

Fay, Harry Elmer Barnes, and John S. Ewart were then cited
to support the claim that:
So long as the Treaty of Versailles contains a
humiliating and erroneous accusation which up to
the present time has provided a real hindrance to
the establishment of peace throughout the world,
26
so long will confusion and dissatisfaction prevail.

25Hbrace G. Alexander, "Germanyt s Demand for Equality,"
The Spectator, CLIV (June 21, 1935), pp. 1058-59; Robert C.
Binkley, "New Light on Russiats War GUilt," Current History,
XXIII (January, 1926), pp. 531-533, and "Revision of World
War History," The Historical Outlook, XIX (March, 1928),
pp. 109-112; Archibald Cary Coolide;e, "Dissatisfied Germany,"
Foreign Affairs, IV (October, 1925), pp. 35-46; Georges
Demartial, IIA Frenchman Lays Blame on France, Russia and
England} U Current History, XXIII (March, 1926), pp. 787-793;
Edward l~Iead Earle, "A Wise and UJ?right Story of War Responsi
bility," The New Republic, LVII (December 5, 1928), pp. 73-75;
Gunther Frantz, "Did Russian Mobilization Force War in 1914?"
Current History, XXV (March, 1929), pp. 852-858; H. W. M.,
"The Question of Responsibility," The Nation and the Athenaeum,
XXX (October 29, 1921), pp. 171-173; Charles Seymour t "Questions
of War Responsibility," Yale Re!iew, XII (July, 1924), pp. 790
794; "The Blunder and the Way:'Otit,~ The Nation, XXVI \February
14, 1920), pp. 661-662; "War-Guilt Myths," The Living Age,
CCCXV (October 28, 1922), pp. 218-222; "The Responsibility for
the War," The New Statesman, XXV (October 3, 1925), pp. 684
685; Editorial, ~e New Statesman, XXVI (October 17, 1925),
J? 100; "England and France,fi The New Statesman, XXXII
(November 24, 1928), pp. 216-217.
26M• M. Hoffman, "Multifold War Guilt," The Commonweal,
XIII (April 29, 1931), pp. 708-709.
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The article concluded with the suggestion that deletion of
Article 231 would remove the obstacles preventing Germany,
Austria, and Hungary from standing on the "same civilized
Christian plane with other nations of Europe.,,27
The settlement reached at Versailles continued to
lose prestige throughout the decade.
one appearing in

~he

Articles such as the

Saturday Review of Literature judged

the entire thing "shameful and disastrous," and called
Article 231 the clause that "surpassed all others in shame, "
and "a lie of such grossness.,,28

Meanwhile, Germany was
referred to as "a gallant and vanquished enemy.1I 29 Another
journal reiterated this theme, insisting: "It is growing
clear that it is not merely the details, but the whole
foundation of the Versailles settlement which must be
challenged •••• ,,30

The purpose of calling the entire Treaty

into question, the editorial asserted, lay in its starting
assumption found in Article 231 which had provided the
~llies

with the means for " ••• coercing Germany into accepting

'the responsibility for causing all the loss and damage,
which the Allies had suffered as a consequence of the war •••• ,,,31

27 Ibid •
28Henry W. Nevinson, "The Great Revision," The Saturday
Review of Literature, III (November 20, 1926), p. 309.
29 Ibid •

--

30 "War Guilt Myths," The Living Age, CCCXV (October
28, 1922), p. 218.
31 Ibid •
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But the significance of the revisionists would not
end here.

As an article in the January 1929 issue of

Review of Reviews predicted,

11 • • •

what these men do so quietly

will in time shake to the foundations the political
alignment of Europe, founded as it is on the Peace Treaties
of 1919. 1132 This statement proved to be prophetic in the
coming decade.
As Britain's preoccupation with the problems of AngloGerman relations increased, politicians and statesmen could
not ignore the public's growing sympathy for German
challenges to the Treaty--Iegal or otherwise--when preparing
a viable foreign policy.

And it was in this realm that the

works of the revisionist historians produced their greatest
impact.

3211Summary of Sidney Fay's Origins of the War,"
Review of Reviews, LXXIX (January, 1928), p. 90.

CHAPTER III
BRITISH POLITICS TO THE RHINELAND CRISIS
When Hitler marched troops into the Rhineland in
1936, the British public viewed with tolerant acceptance
this clear breach of the Versailles Treaty.

There were
1
many reasons to account for such a mild reaction.
But
one of the most important was the impact of the revisionist
historians on the intellectual climate of the times.

Their

findings helped to shape a series of views--dislike of the
Treaty, guilt over the mistreatment of Germany, sympathy
for her goals, and mistrust of France--upon which a proGerman attitude came to be predicated.

In this chapter

the effects of such sentiments on the direction of British
foreign policy during the crucial years prior to remilita
rization will be analyzed.
Many observers have noted this development of sympathy

1Malcolm Muggeridge, The Thirties: 1930-1940 in Great
Britain, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940); Thomas Jones, A
Diar With Letters: 19 1-1950, (Oxford University Press,
195 ; James Ramsay Montague Butler, Lord Lothian
Phili
Kerr
1882-1940 (London: MacMillan and Co. t . , 9 0 ;
Alfred Leslie Rowse, Appeasement: A study in Political
Decline 1933-193, (New York: W. W. Worton and Co. Inc.,
19 1 ; aron L. Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland: Britain,
France and the Rhineland." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Indiana University, 1967.
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for Britain's former enemy.

One historian wrote that

these feelings sprang from illusions harbored during the
inter-war period that "Germany had not 'really' started the
war of 1914; Germany had been 'crushed' by the Versailles
Treaty, which was in all respects vengeful and unjust •••• 112
Harold MacMillan, a young backbencher at the time, agreed
that Britain did have a guilt complex, " ••• a feeling that
Germany had a rough time. 11 3 Elaborating on this idea,
he wrote:
••• there was a still more powerful force operating
on the British conscience. We were uneasy about
Germany and her treatment since the end of the
war •••• The Treaty of Versailles was no sooner
framed then it came under powerful attack.4
Moreover, MacMillan explicitly referred to the

revisionist

history being published as one cause for the confused
opinion over Germany which, he claimed, helped to produce
the weak and indeterminant policy followed in the 1930's.5
One concrete method for ameliorating this sense of
wrongdoing, suggested by countless writers, was to revise
or remove the Treaty entirely.

Underlying this view was

2Lewis Oharles Bernard Seaman, Life in Britain Between
the Wars, English Life Series, ed. Peter Quennell, (London:
B. T. Batsford, 1970), p. 191.
3Harold MacMillan, Winds of Ch~e, Vol. I of Memoirs,
(3 vols., New York: Harper and Row, 1~), pp. 350-351.
4Ibid ., pp. 348-349.
5Ibid ., pp. 348-350.
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the belief that " ••• the elimination of justified causes of
dissatisfaction and resentment would be a means of ad
justing the balance of power.,,6

There was also evidence

that the British Government faced considerable public
pressure to make these principles of 'justice' the basis
of practical policy considerations.?

Echoing this call

for Treaty revision throughout the thirties, British
journals also joined in decrying the Versailles Settlement
as a great obstacle to peace. 8
It was only a small step from these general, amorphous
feelings of sympathy for Germany to the philosophy of appease
ment which originated during the 1920's and beeame British
policy in the 1930's.

Prior to Hitler's coming to power

four reasons existed for appeasement.

First was a belief

in a "special Anglo-German affinity ••• whose origins went
back to the days when Angles and Saxons set off in the
o

wattle boats ••• a unity of blood •••a."close cultural association.";;

6Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars:
Conflictin Strate ies of Peace Since Versailles, (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940 , p. 222.
?Ibid., pp. 216-217.
8S • K. Ratcliffe, "Ourselves and the NevI Germany,"
Contemporary Revievl, CLXIV (September, 1933), p. 270; "Herr
Hitler and Versailles," The Spectator, CLIV ,May 17, 1935),
pp. 824-825.
9Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, PPQ 142-143.
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Second was general recognition of a
••• shared Anglo-German responsibility in the
outbreak of war--a belief fostered by Britisb
historians and encouraged by German propa
ganda, casting doubt on the morality of Britain's
actions in 1914, and leading to tbe question:
'Could Britain, by a different foreign policy
have averted an Anglo-German clash?'10
Third, appeasement seemed justified by the alleged severity
of Versailles, a major cause of German bitterness.

And

finally, it sprang from a desire to find an alternative to
a pro-Frencb policy, out of fear France would use Britain
to keep Germany weak.

The growth of pacifism in reaction

to tbe borrors of the First War and the economic policies
of tbe British Government which was anxious to restore
normal trade relations with the profitable German market
also contributed to the acceptance of this policy.

But

in order to succeed as a philosophy, appeasement needed to
buttress tbe pragmatic considerations of political necessity
with tbe prestige of scholarly research provided by tbe
11
historian.
And the revisionists were welcome in tbe
attainment of "an Anglo-German rapprochement, even an
Anglo-German alliance. 1I12
All through the inter-war years tbis policy exerted
10 Ibid •
11

Ibid., pp. 165-166.

12Martin Gilbert and Ricbard Gott, Tbe Appeasers.
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), p. 41.
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considerable attraction, appealing to a battle-scarred
generation " ••• who hoped negotiation and accommodation
would replace war as a means of settling disputes. u13

It

also attracted radicals and pacifists who denied Germany
had been solely responsible for the First War and argued
she had received inequitable treatment at the peace confer
ence. 14

But after 1933, appeasement moved from this limited

base to embrace adherents from all political parties and
in all social classes.

It became an

It • • •

a ttitude of mind

common to many politicians, diplomats, civil servants,
historians,

journalists, industrialists, businessmen,

shopkeepers, students, workers and housewives. 1l15
Nevertheless, at no time did a complete consensus
over foreign policy exist.

According to Neville Thompson

who has done a study of the opposition to appeasement,
when dissent occurred, it was sporadic and came from indi
vidual critics and small cliques; no cohesive group formed
16
until after Eden resigned in 1938.
Thompson gives a
number of reasons for this failure: first,

it was difficult

to devise effective alternatives to government positions;

13Neville
Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930's, (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 197
14 Ibid ., p. 28"
15Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 147"
16Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, p. 2.
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second, the individual views of anti-appeasers about what
should be done were often too different for them to agree.
Finally, I'to critic ize an Administration that could present
its policies in such comforting terms and which commanded
an overwhelming majority of loyal adherents was no easy task.,,17
The three leading Conservative backbenehers who did
object to the direction of British policy in the early
thirties--Winston Churchill, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and
Leopold Amery--were too few in number and had no official
position in the National Government to implement their views.

18

Another bastion of anti-German sentiment, the Foreign Office,
also tried to change the direction of Anglo-German relations.
But none of the many warnings issued by its Permanent
Undersecretary, Lord Vansittart, or Sir Horace Rumbold,
Britain's Ambassador to Germany until mid-1933, altered
significantly the determination of the Cabinet to appease. 19

17Ibid., pp. 26,42,45.
18 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
19Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Vol. I of
The Second World War, (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1948), p. 81; John Connell (pseud) John Henry Robertson, The
'Office': The Star of the British Forei n Office: 1919-1951,
New York: St. Marin's Press, 19 8 ,pp. 20,243; Gordon A.
Craig and Felix Gilbert, ads., The Diplomats: 1919-1939, Vols. I
and II Atheneum (2 vols., New York: Princeton University Press,
1953), pp. 15-48, 438-447; William Newton Medlicott, Britain
and Germ
: The Search for A reement 1930-1937, (University
of London: The Athlone Press, 19 9 , p. 3; Robert Vansittart,
The Mist Procession: The Autobio ra h of Lord Vansittart,
London: Rutc ison and Co. Ltd., 958, pp. 222-223; Great
Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1919-1939, 2nd. ser., Vbl. XII.
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Ignoring these protests, the men who came to power
in the election of 1931--a triumph for the Conservative
Party--proved willing to tolerate revisions of the Treaty.20
In the election of 1935, which retained the National
Government in power under Stanley Baldwin's leadership, the
process of accepting German abrogations of Treaty provisions
21
continued.
It is in the context of these developments
that the Rhineland crisis must be understood: not as an
isolated incident but as part of a pattern of events aimed
at destroying the status quo set up at Versailles.

For

example, allowing Hitler to rearm, and then giVing this
action a certain amount of legitimacy with the announcement
of an Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June, 1935, only
encouraged him to challenge other provisions.

In addition,

the Nazi dictator took heart from British and French
failures to bring Mussolini to account, the League of Nations'
20Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Year~ Memoirs, 1931-1945,
Vol. II (2 vols., London: Fredrick Muller Ltd., 1957), p. 22,
and "The Present Situation," The Political Quarterly, VI
(July, 1935), pp. 327-329; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement, p. 107;
MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 341; Fredrick Edwin Smith,
Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax, (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1965), p. 339; Elaine Windrich, British Labour's Foreign
POliC\, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952),
pp. 2 -22; Leonard Woolf, "Labour's Foreign PolicY,ll Political
Quarterly, IV (October, 1933), pp. 506-507; Wolfers, Britain
and France Between Two Ware, p. 214.
21 The Times, (London), House of Commons: 1935, (London:
The Times Office, 1935), p. 23; Gilbert, Roots of Appeasement,
pp. 149-150; Medlicott, Britain and Germany: The Search for
Agreement, Pp. 15-16; "Forward," New Statesman and Nation,
VIII (September 29, 1934), pp. 415-419.
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growing impotence, Italy's preoccupation with Africa, and
Anglo-French diSarray.22
The collapse of the Hoare-Laval Plan and the entire
Abyssinian issue had severely weakened Britain's position
in a number of ways.

At home Baldwin's reputation slumped,

the episode nearly costing the Prime Minister his political
life; and according to Churchill, "It shook Parliament and
the nation to its base. u23 Abroad, Germany deduced from
Hoare's disgrace that Britain was unwilling to go to war
to support her proclaimed rights and responsibilities,
causing the Nazis to feel contempt for the British.
Meanwhile, the French felt isolated and betrayed. 24
With the climate thus favorable for another dramatic
move, Hitler began to search for a new pretext to dismantle
Versailles further.

And France's determination to ratify

the Franco-Soviet Pact, negotiated the previous year, gave
him the excuse he needed.

On February 28, in Paris, the

Chamber of Deputies voted in favor of the Treaty; the next
day, in Berlin, the French Ambassador received instructions
to approach the German Government about the basis for

22Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators Vol. II of
The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, {Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Col, 1962), pp. 370-371.
23Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 185.
24Connell, The 'Office', pp. 218-221.
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general negotiations for a Franco-German understanding.
Hitler asked for a few days to think about the French
suggestion.

Then, on Saturday morning, March 7, 1936,

Herr von Nuerath, the German Foreign Minister, summoned
the British, French, Belgian, and Italian ambassadors to
the Wilhelmstrasse and offered proposals for a twenty-five
year pact, demilitarization on both sides of the Rhine
frontier, limiting of air forces, and non-aggression pacts
to be negotiated with Germany's Eastern and Western neighbors.
On the same day,

~o

hours after these offers, Hitler

announced to the Reichstag Germany's intention to reoccupy
the Rhineland.

As Hitler was speaking, 35,000 soldiers

crossed the boundary and entered all the main German towns
where they were received everywhere with rejoicing.
Britain and France had many reasons for moving
directly and forcefully against Germany.

First, strategic

considerations impelled the Western Democracies to retain
the demilitarized zone in order to come to the aid of
France's Eastern allies in case of an attack.

Legally,

both the Versailles and Locarno Treaties entitled them to
repel Germany from this zone. 25 Furthermore, should Hitler
succeed in making good the coup, sanctity of all treaties
25Wolfers, Britain and France Between ~o Wars, pp. 42,
45,50.
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would be jeopardized and the League weakened even more.
The Democracies would be discredited: their prestige
already damaged after the failure to apply sanctions in
Ethiopia.

And French morale would be lowered by British

reluctance to support her in what she considered a legiti
mate enterprise.

Finally, by allowing Hitler to win so

easily, a pattern for future Nazi gain would be established,
and the dictator earn a much needed success to enable him
to carry out other illegal acts.
In spite of the reasons for moving decisively
against Hitler, Eden and the National Government temporized.

26

Explanations for Britain's failure to support France at
this crucial time have been many and varied.

Treaty viola

tions were nothing new, and modifications of Versailles had
occurred frequently in an atmosphere of "tacit acquiescence. 1I27
Foreign Office documents indicate that Britain had long
been expecting remilitarization and preferred to view this
concession as a bargaining chip to gain diplomatic advantages
and not as the last opportunity to overthrow the Nazi regime.

28

26Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates
(House of Commons), 5~ ser., Vol. 309 (24 Feb.-13 Mar., 1936),
pp. 1814-1817; Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 381.
27William Norton Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E.
Lambert, eds., Documents on British Forei
Polic
1919
1939, Second Series, XII London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1972), pp. 149-150.
28Medlicott, Britain and Germany: The Search for
Agreement, p. 24.
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Moreover, the deplorable situation of British armaments
during the early thirties cannot be ignored. 29 But it
was the mood of the public more than anything else that
was cited by those in power as the motive behind Government
reluctance to use force.

Many officials shared a genuine

belief that British sentiment favored Germany in this
instance, and they hesitated to implement any policy
which might risk a war.

29Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 71; Eden,
Facing the Dictators, p. 396.

CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO HITLER'S COUP
Although the Rhineland crisis lasted several weeks,
there was little controversy over what direction the
Government should take.

Few people considered war desir

able at this time; and the largest segment of public opinion
favored Germany once more established in her own territory.1
The real issue turned on how to restore a feeling of securi
ty to the continent and eliminate danger of Eritish in
volvement in a potential conflict between France and
Germany.

No doubt many political, diplomatic, and military

considerations entered into the decision to appease Hitler;
yet, the mood of the Eritish people was the reason given
by most officials for pursuing this course.

The evidence

indicates that many members of the Government shared the
public's sympathy with German attempts to revise an un
popular Treaty, agreeing that it lacked the moral authority
to insure enforcement of its provisions.

1In a poll conducted by the Daily Express, 55%
favored the German position while only 24% favored the
French, and 21% were not interested. See Samuel H. Cuff,
The Face of War: 1931-1942, (New York: Julian Messner, Inc.,
1942), p. 26.
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As Prime Minister and elder statesman of the
Conservative Party, Stanley Baldwin exerted influence on
the formulation of foreign policy.

In the twenties, Baldwin

had been a Francophile and " ••• certainly not in sympathy
with the facile denegration of France common among the pro
German faction in Britain.,,2

Nevertheless, Baldwin was

extremely reluctant to join France in any strong measures
against Germany in the Rhineland.

As he indicated to M.

Flandin when voicing the Cabinet's hesitation over supporting
France, his decision came from a conviction:
' ••• if there is even one chance in a hundred that
war would follow your police operation, I have not
the right to commit England ••• England is not in a
state to go to war.'13
According to Baldwin, the public favored Germany's right to
enter and occupy the Rhineland; therefore, he could not risk
any action that might jeopardize the peace.

Only with

reserve did the Prime Minister support Eden in initiating
staff talks with France in the face of a public

Il' ... half

convinced that secret conversations were the cause of the
Firs t War •••• 1,,4
2Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biograp~y,
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 181.
3Stanley Baldwin as quoted in Connell, The'Office', p.238.
4Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography, p. 920,
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Witbin Baldwin's Cabinet, little entbusiasm existed
for aiding France.

Tbe majority thought it " ••• wbolly

unreasonable to use force to resist a German occupation of
the Rhineland •.. Germany had a case for doing as she wished. II5
While discussing the events of Marcb 7, they expressed only
slight displeasure witb Hitler's goals, reserving criticism
for the metbods be had used.
Viscount

.
Halifax

In a speech on foreign policy,

actually commended Hitler's desire to put

troops into tbe Rhineland.

He did not find it difficult

" ••• to understand the German claim to establisb full
sovereignty over German soil.,,6

The Lord Chancellor only

admonished Hitler for weakening Britisb sympathy over
German aims by sucb a flagrant, brutal display of force.
In Halifax's judgement, Germany could probably have achieved
tbe same objective by reason. 7

In a similar vein, Chancellor

of the Excbequer Neville Chamberlain approved of gratifying
German desires for expansion, and he proposed to save the
peace by offering a colony to Germany.8
With more vigor tban the Cabinet bad exhibited, members

5Ibid., p. 914.
6Viscount Halifax, Speeches on Foreign Policy, ed.
H. H. E. Craster, (London: Oxford University Press~ 1940),
p. 35, and Fulness of Days, (London: Collins, 1957).

7Ibid ., pp. 35-39.
8MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 427.
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of Parliament debated this issue both inside and outside
the House of Commons.

While complete agreement never

occurred, a considerable portion of the members did appear
willing to accept German entrance into the Rhineland.

One

MP's letter to The Times called for substitution of the
German peace proposals in place of the Treaty of Versailles
which had been erected on "the sands of resentment, fear,
and revenge. 1I9

This became the frequently repeated theme

in the weeks after March 7.

Lord Allen of Hurtwood, an

active pacifist since World War I, a firm supporter of the
League and collective security, and an advocate of justice
to Germany by revision of the Treaty, also wrote to The
Times about the "splendid opportunity" offered by the crisis.
He feared the chance might be missed to solve simultaneously
the inseparable problems of equality, security, and treaty
revision, and urged Britain not to repeat "the tragic
mistakes of the past.,,10

Another MP Sir Arnold Wilson,

speaking before The 1912 Club of London, proposed taking
Hitler at his word and making every effort to get France
and Belgium to accept his new offer because "sooner or
later an outlet must be found for crermany."

11

Three days

9The Times (London), March 17, 1936, p. 12.
to the Editor from T. C. R. Moore, MP.
10
The Times (London), March 11, 1936, p. 17.
11 Ibid •

Letter

50
later, Wilson urged an end to harping over Hitler's vio
lation of the Locarno Treaty, remarking that in the past
twenty years treaty after treaty had been broken when no
12
longer acceptable to public opinion.
More often, however, people preferred to discount
the Peace Settlement rather than Locarno when rationalizing
Hitler's action.

If Versailles could be proven invalid,

then remilitarization would no longer be construed a vio
lation of its provisions.

This may explain why Lord

Londonderry, an advocate of appeasement, attacked the
Treaty so strongly a few days after the crisis began:
The Treaty of Versailles can properly be said to
have shown itself to be a dO~UMnt of singular
ineptitude. It disregarded the majority of
those principles which would guide victors in
imposing conditions on the vanquished, and the
sooner that treaty is buried and tne Covenant
of the League of Nations freed from its baneful
influence the better for the peace of Europe ••••
The occupation of the demilitarized zone is a
logical sequence to recent events.13
One phrase extremely popular at this time, "they are
only going into their own back yards,,,14 reflected the lens
through which most people chose to view the Rhineland issue.
Few cared to remember that Hitler had broken international
law.

And Lord Lothian's slogan provided a means for absolving

12 The Times (London), March 14, 1936, p. 14.
13 The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 15.
14Butler, Lord Lothian, pp. 212-213.
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German action of its offensiveness by placing it in a
harmless sounding context.
Although members of the

~overnment

actively diseussed

this issue in public speeches and the Press, they had no
opportunity for debate within the House of Commons until
March 26.

Two days after the event, Eden informed Commons

about the latest German coup and impending Government action,
but he requested no debate for a fortnight.

Instead, he

responded briefly during "question and answer period" to
developments in negotiations.

Observing reaction to Eden's

news, Harold Nicolson recorded in his diary that the general
mood of the House was one of fear: "Anything to keep out
of war. 1,15

Because of this predisposition, MP 1s of all

parties were content to leave matters to the Government.
Even Churchill, a harsh critic of appeasement, did not speak
out immediately because Baldwin was considering him for
Minister of Defense--a post which eventually went to Sir
Thomas Inskip.16
At last, on March 20, the Foreign Secretary made a
lengthy speech covering diplomatic actions taken since
March 7, and stressed willingness to accept remilitarization

15Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939,
Vol. II, ed. Nigel Nicolson, (3 vols., New York: Atheneum,
1966), p. 248.
16Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 107-108.

52
as a fait accompli in order to rebuild the shattered peace
a.nd lost confidence. 17 He recounted a series of diplomatic
manoeuvres made under the aegis of the Locarno Powers and
Council of the League, aimed at resolving the crisis
satisfactorily.18

Two days after Eden's speech, Nacolson

once more described the 'pro-German' attitude in the House
which he adduced to mean "afraid of war.,,19
Then, on March 16, nineteen days after the event,
debate commenced.

But by this time, nothing that might

have been said in the Commons would have made a great deal
20
of difference.
Eden began discussion, summarizing the
entire British position regarding the Rhineland and her
obligations under Locarno: Versailles was mentioned only
21
once.
He then reviewed all diplomacy since M~rch 7,
once more indicating the matter be considered a fait
accompli so rebuilding of lost confidence could proceed. 22
The speech concluded with a list of the country's goals:

17Great Britain Parliament, Parliamentary Debates
(House of Commons), 5lli Ser., Vol. 310 (16 Mar.-9 Apr., 1936),
p. 846.
18Ibid ., pp. 847-848.
19Nicolson, Diaries, p. 254, and "Has Britain a Policy?"
Foreign Affairs, XIV (July, 1936), pp. 549-562.
20Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 107-108.
21Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates,
(House of Cbmmons), 5~ ser., Vbl. 310 (16 Mar.-9 Apr., 1936),
pp. 1440-1445.
22 Ibid •
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recognition of British obligations to Locarno, prevention
of war, creation of conditions for negotiation,

str~hening

of collective security, and encouragement of Germany's
return to the League so that "in a happier atmosphere"
larger matters of economics and armaments can be discussed
since they are "indispensable to the appeasement of Europe.,,2 3
Eden later estimated that the reaction to his proposals was
even better than expected: "the House was understanding and
the majority of Members was fervent in support. 1I24
Then, debate over these matters ensued.
speaking for Labour, took little notice of

Hugh Dalton,

~ermany's

provoc

ative action; instead, he condemned British policy for pro
posing an international peace keeping force, staff consul
tations with France and Belgium, and negotiating with the
Locarno Powers separately from the League. 25 Dalton insisted
on the German's right to equality--political and economic-
and urged that country to return to the League. 26 No other
course was feasible because, in Dalton's estimation,

23 Ibid ., p. 1450.
24Eden , Facing the Dictators, p. 407.
25Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates
(House of Commons), 5ili ser., Vol. 310 (16 Mar.-9 Apr., 1936),
pp. 1453-1456.
26 Ibid., p. 1459.
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••• public opinion in this country, would not
support and certainly the Labour party would
not support, the taking of military sanctions
against Germany at this time, in order to put
German troops out of the Rhineland.27
Moreover, he asserted, public opinion drew a clear dis
tinction between actions taken by Mussolini, labeling them
aggression, and actions taken by Herr Hitler.

This was

because in the latter instance they had occurred within
the frontiers of the German Reich. 28 Clement Attlee,
leader of the Labour Party and traditionally hostile to
treaty revision, disagreed with Dalton, objecting to making
any retribution to Germany for suffering from the "evils

of Versailles.,,29
The controversy persisted with those desiring to
appease the Nazis alluding to the unfair Peace Settlement
to justify this view.

Even Lloyd-George, who had helped

to negotiate the Treaty, had come to shift his position in
favor of revision.

He explained that " ••• you cannot treat

this as if it were Holy Writ," which only weakened the
document further. 30 Next, Sir Archibald Sinclair joined in
the discussion, reasoning that since Germany had already
broken the

I1

s ilackles of Versailles,11 we ought to have

27 Ibid ., pp. 1457-1458.
28 Ibid •
29

Ibid., pp. 1535-1536.

30 Ibid., p. 1477.
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struck them off before now.

He then urged that the

opportunity for real peace should not be allowed to pass
31
by ignoring Hitler's proposals.
While some members opposed Government policy, they
did not materially influence its direction.

And even those

against appeasement agreed with Churchill's observation
that a general consensus in favor of Eden and the Government
existed within the House. 32 As an alternative, Churchill
proposed pursuing collective security, and if that failed,
making an alliance with France. 33 Harold Nicolson strongly
supported strengthening ties with France, and during a
speech before Commons, he traced the paradox of British
policy.

In the years after the

~r,

when Germany had been

weak, any benefits given to her had been criticized.

HUt

now that Germany had become strong, "there is a great wave
of pro-German feeling at this moment sweeping the country.,,34
When it was his turn to speak, another opponent of the
present policy, Robert Boothby, suggested sympathy was due
"very largely to a reaction on the part of our people
against a foreign policy in which they have never believed,
and which was carried out in a manner which they thought

31 Ibid ., pp. 1461-1468.
32 Ibid., pp. 1528-1535.
33 Ibid •
34 Ibid ., p. 1473.
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was grossly unfair to Germany •••• ,,35

Boothby seemed to

infer that people's gUilt over past mistakes had clouded
their judgement about the Nazi regime, thereby inducing
an

inade~uate

response to Hitler's breach of the Treaty.

Opposition to the policies outlined by Eden could
also be found within the Foreign Office.

Churchill's

friend Ralph Wigram clearly saw the inherent dangers of
appeasement.

And after Hitler's coup, he predicted: "'War

is now inevitable, and I think it will be the most terrible
war there has been •••• ",3 6 Meanwhile, at the annual dinner
of the Cambridge University Conservative Association, a few
days after Hitler's dramatic move, another outspoken critic
Austen Chamberlain sharply called the dictator to account
for Violating Locarno and Versailles.

Emphatically he

denied the German view that the Treaties ought not to be
respected; Chamberlain insisted Britain must uphold the
law. 37 But the time was not yet ripe for these critics;
their ranks were thin, and their arguments calling for
adherence to treaties and resumption of a traditional
foreign policy aimed at restoring the balance of power
found no receptive audience in 1936.
35 Ibid., p. 1497.
36Connell, The 'Office', pp. 239-240.
37The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 8.

CHAPTER V
PRESS REACTION
The British press, led by The Times, played a crucial
role in helping to drown out the warnings issued by critics
of appeasement.

It supported the Government and adhered to

a position that remilitarization was inevitable sooner or
later.

Therefore, while not condoning Hitler's action,

newspapers urged Britain to be ready to seize the opportunity
1
of wresting good from evil.
One reason for promoting this
opinion was that "both financially and intellectually it
was unwise or impossible for the British Press to adopt
a strongly critical line ••• the readers did not want to
read it and the intellectuals did not want to write it.,,2
In fact, many English journalists and editors, impressed
by the historians' views on this matter, felt that the
harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty entitled the Nazis to
the benefit of the doubt.

tilt even made some commentators

willingto excuse 'these things' as being 'inevitable'
consequences of the Allied policies of revenge at what

1Franklin Reid Gannon, The British Press and Germany:
1936-1939, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 98.
2

Ibid., p. 2.
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should have been the peace table •••• ,,3
Undoubtedly The Times was the most important British
paper in the thirties. 4 In foreign affairs it acted as the
spokesman for the National Government, molded public
opinion, and served as a barometer for officials to judge
the mood of the country.

Thus its influence rebounded in

many directions, and the paper's editorial position toward
Germany and militarization is worth a close study.
Geoffrey Dawson, editor from 1923-1941, had complete
authority for foreign affairs.

A supporter of appeasement,

he kept close ties to the Foreign Office and periodically
went there to talk with Eden over many topics relating to
national security.

In the days following Hitler's coup,

Dawson met the Foreign Secretary a number of times and also
Lord Halifax who was closely involved in negotiations over
the Rhineland, and thereby conversant with official policy.5
Robert M. Barrinton-Ward, Dawson's assistant editor, was
another advocate of appeasement and believer in the
6
perniciousness of the Treaty of Versailles.
Together

3Brigitte Granzow, A Mirror of Nazism: British Opinion
and the Emergence of Hitler, 1929-1933, (London: ~ictor
Gollancz Ltd., 1964), p. 14.
4Gannon , The British Press and Germa~y, p. 56

Q

5John Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times,
(London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1955), p. 330,332.
6Gannon, The British Press and GermaQy, p. 56.
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these two men were mainly responsible for the editorials
that appeared in the days succeeding Hitler's entry.
One of the best known of these editorials, cited
often to represent British reluctance over antagonizing
Germany appeared two days after the event.

Titled IIA

Chance to Rebuild, I' the editorial took a sympathetic view
of the coup.

First it called for a careful examination of

the peace proposals Hitler had made; then it made a dis
tinction between Versailles and Locarno.

In The

Times~

estimation, the original Peace Settlements contained
"penal and discriminatory clauses" and needed to be done
away with because they continued to preserve " ••• the mood
of war-bitterness and war-exhaustion in which they were
drafted, maintained an unstable equilibrium and threatened
the durability of the Settlement as a whole.,,7

Only Locarno

should be retained and its provisions honored.
But there were people who refused to disregard the
Treaty of Versailles in this matter.

As Arnold Wolfers has

shown, it clearly stated in Articles 42, 43, and 44 the
right of France and Britain to prevent Germany from con
structing fortifications, maintaining armed forces, or
holding military manoeuvres of any kind in an area " ••• on
the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west

7The Times (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15.
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of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. n8
Although Locarno guaranteed these frontiers too, it also
made a separation between flagrant and non-flagrant breaches
of Articles 42 and 43, and only in the first case did
France have the right of immediate and independent action
with a British promise of assistance.

In a non-flagrant

case, the matter would be referred to the League.

Thus,

much to France's distress, she found out during this crisis
that if Britain did not wish to take a hard line against
Hitler, the Government could portray his action as non
flagrant. 9

This argument was an important motive for

directing new attacks against the Treaty of Versailles,
which by 1936, had lost so much of its authority.
The Times concluded with a justification of Hitler's
move, explaining that he was only marching into German
territory, and carried pictures of cheering and enthusiastic
10
crowds welcoming the troops as evidence.
It finished with
a plea to use this opportunity to strengthen the peace of
Europe, claiming that the old structure, " ••• one-sided and
unbalanced, is nearly in ruins.
despair, but to rebuild. 1I11

It is the moment not to

Ending Versailles and restoring

8Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars, p. 42.
9 Ibid., p. 45.
10The Times (London), March 9, 1936), p. 18.
11 Ibid ., p. 15.
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Germany to a position of equality became the cornerstone
of the paper's editorial policy

vi8-a~vis

Anglo-German

relations during this tense period.
With The Times leading the way, most of Britain's
newspapers expressed their belief in the sincerity of
12
The Daily
Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact.
Herald contended that due to the unfair, inequitable
treatment meted out to Germany, the British people would
not fight to prevent JlGerman troops from garrisoning
German to~rns.,,13

The same article also urged the League

Council, when it met, to devote itself " ••• not to recrimi
nation and useless snarling, but to the constructive task
of making, with this as the opportunity, a new, more
equitable, and, therefore, more lasting settlement ... ·14
Implicit in this charge was the view that prior ones had
been less than fair to Germany.

Lord Rothmore's Daily

Mail had from the outset an admiration for the internal
accomplishments of the Nazi regime, both spiritual and
material. 15 Therefore, it was no surprise to find an
editorial stance highly sympathetic to Hitler's move.

12Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 58.
13Daily Herald as quoted in The Times (London),
March 10, 1936, p. 18.
14 Ibid •
15Gannon, The British Press and Germany, p. 32.
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The paper called on Britain to face the situation "without
agitation.

It has caused no crisis, and in reality has

made no substantial change in conditions.,,16

Denying

emphatically the possibility of British involvement in
the crisis, Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express, the world's
largest single daily, wrote: "Will Britain be involved in
war?

The answer is NO!,,17

Another Beaverbrook paper, the

Evening Standard, took an even firmer pro-German stand,
portraying the situation in these dramatic terms:
Britain has awakened from a nightmare. She finds
herself blessedly free of a Pact, which, lightly
undertaken, was a constant menace to her hope of
peace and prosperity •••• Let us start fresh.18
Germany was not perceived as a threat at this time.
Even those papers not usually considered favorable
to the Nazis were surprisingly mild on the issue of remili
tarization.

One of these, the Morning Post, carried the

extreme right wing Tory line toward international affairs,
seeing Bolshevism and Nazism equally repugnant. 19
Nevertheless, in this case it appealed for British statesmen
to consider the German proposals "with cool heads, since
16Daily Mail as quoted in ~he Times (London), March
10, 1936, p. 18.

17Dail~ Express as quoted in The Times (London),
March 10, 193 , p. 18.
18Evening Standard as quoted in The Times (London),
March 10, 1936, p. 18.
19Gannon, The British Press and GermaQy, pp. 49-52.

63
there is no alternative to discussion but to thrust the
German

~oops

from the Rhineland by war which is not

possible even if it were a reasonable proPosition."20
Another newspaper, the Liberal News Chronicle had a
21
reputation for annoying the Nazis.
And yet, it
estimated that because of the strongly pro-German tide,
plus Hitler's offer of terms to rebuild good international
relations, not a single Englishman would regard the
occupation " ••• as constituting sufficient ground for sup
porting French punitive measures against Germany.,,22
Only the Daily Telegraph, with a large middle class circu
lation, suggested wariness when examining the memorandum
containing Hitler's counterproposals of good faith. 23
Both Sunday papers, The Observer, older and more
influential despite its small circulation, and the Sunday
Times, maintained a sympathetic line on almost all German
matters.

The Observer had great contempt for Versailles

and the whole

sys~em

of international affairs it represented,

considering an agreement between England and Germany possible

20Morning Post as quoted in The Times (London),
March 10, 1936, p. 18.
21Gannon, The British Press and Germany, pp. 38-42.
22News Chronicle as quoted in The Times (London),
I1arch 10, 1936, p. 18.

23Dail~ Telegraph as~oted in The Times (London),
March 10, 193 , p. 18.

64
and desirable. 24

Likewise, the Sunday Times was also con

vinced of the advisability of an Anglo-German rapprochement,
and the paper's owner, Lord Kemsly, did not hesitate to
use his influence via his newspaper to smooth the way.25
In the provinces, the Manchester Guardian, a paper
with a comparatively small circulation "deserved and en
joyed an international reputation as the liberal counterpart
of The Times.,,26

Classified a liberal paper, not beceause

it spoke for that party, but rather due to "the kind of
people and intellectuals it attracted both as staff and as
readers",27 the Guardian illustrated how a paper can become
the prisoner of its own ideology.

It stood committed to

certain things: the inequity of Versailles, the villainy
of France, abhorrence of war, and enthusiasm for the
28
Weimar Republic.
Given these sentiments, the newspaper
faced a tremendous dilemma after Hitler acceded to power
and began demanding changes based on his claim of unjust
treatment from the peace conference.

The intellectual

difficulties the newspaper encountered in reconciling its
preconceived views about the Treaty with these claims by

24Gannon, The British Press and Germany, pp. 51-52.
25
Ibid., pp. 53-54.
26 Ibid ., p. viii.
27 Ibid ., pp. 74-79.
28 Ibid •
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a dictator it detested indicated the negative impact
which the revisionist historians could produce on discussions
of foreign affairs in the 1930's.

The paradox facing the

Guardian grew out of these pre-existing attitudes about
certain issues which came to control the paper's treatment
of Germany:
••• the Manchester Guardian could not deny the justice
even of a dictator's 'just' demands. The Manchester
Guardian was in the complicated position of knowing
what the Nazi regime and its ideas must lead to, but
being unable to oppose various demands based upon
what it deemed genuine grievances in which Britain
had complied at Versailles ••.• 29
The result was that although the Guardian had a clear
conception from 1933 onwards of Nazi Germany:
It could not draw the logical conclusions of this
insight and was forced, each time it was confronted
with the continual German heinousness it had always
predicted, suddenly to urge tolerance and moderation
either because wa~-was unthinkable, or because no
one's conscience was wholly clear •••• 30
A quick glance at other papers outside of London
revealed a large body of pro-German feeling throughout
Britain.

The Yorkshire Post, Birmingham Post, Liverpool

Post, Nottingham Guardian, Sheffield Telegraph and North
Mail, all downgraded the significance of Hitler's move, and
the Sheffield Telegraph characterized the situation as no
act of aggression; Germany has " ••• merely relieved herself

29Gannon, The British Press and Germany, p. 78.
30Ibid., pp. 87-88.
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of a humiliation by re-occupying her own territory."31
At the same time, these papers expressed hopes that Hitler's
proposals receive a cool examination, so that out of bad
some good may come. 32 Only a very few papers such as the
Glasgow Herald and Western Morning News seemed willing to
take a less conciliatory p0sition, refusing to be bribed
by the peace proposals and denouncing the unilateral
abandonment of Versailles and Locarno. 33
Other segments of the British Press, consisting of
the weekly, monthly, and quarterly, also acted as an im
portant forum for public opinion, and in the ensuing months
much was published on the Nazis' latest move.

New Statesman

and Nation, a liberal journal of political and social
criticism, within a week after the coup, ran two articles.
In the first, it estimated that British sentiment, even
though deploring Hitler's violent methods, accepted his
moral right to the Rhineland. 34 Starting with this premise,
the journal then presented an editorial in the same issue,
using as an example of popular feeling a bus conductor's

31Sheffield Telegraph as quoted in The Times (London),
March 10, 1936, p. 18.
32Birmingham Post, ¥ottingham Guardian, Liverpool
Post, Yorkshire Post, North Mail, as quoted in The Times
(London), March 10, 1936, p. 18.
33Western Morning News, Glasgow Herald, as quoted
in The Times (London), March 10, 1936, p. 18.
341'The Week-End ReView," New Statesman and Nation,
XI (March 14, 1936), p. 3b~.
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pronouncement that remilitarization " ••• is no more than
to move his family into his own back yard.,,35

To explain

this concept, the editors concluded:
We all have bad consciences about Germany's
treatment since the war. England has talked
of Germany's right to equality in Europe ever
since she joined with France to deprive her
of it.36
The following week another editorial appeared, reiterating
the same belief that a guilty conscience had produced the
confusion of British opinion on this matter.

It did warn,

however, that people were too willing to accept the idea
that once injustices of Versailles had been removed, Europe
would know peace. 37
The Spectator, a journal offering an independent
political and cultural approach, found little to be disturbed
about, and considered it foolish to think German inequality
could be maintained permanently, " •.• nor is anyone disposed
to moralise overmmch about Germany's repeated breaking of
the Treaty of Versailles •••• ,,3 8 Only the details of re
storing Germany to her former footing remained to be worked

35"Is There a Way to Peace?" New Statesman and Nation,
XI (March 14, 1936), pp. 372-373.
36Ibid.
371lBritish Opinion and British Policy," New Statesman
and Nation, XI (March 21, 1936), p. 444.
38nThe German Challenge," Spectator, eLVI (March 13,
1936), pp. 456-457.
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out.

Thus, this situation presented an excellent opportunity

to begin negotiations, based on Hitler's suggestions of a
Western Pact. 39 The next week, the Spectator once more
commented that demilitarization was a thing of the past;
it should be accepted as a fait accompli, and war was out
of the question in this situation. 40
Other articles that appeared were repetitious,
continuing to assert that remilitarization was " ••• no more
than an emphatic and final repudiation of 'war guilt. ,,,41
Clearly this jUdgement rested upon the understanding that
the Peace Conference had committed a real injustice, thereby
creating a reasonably strong case for restoring German
equality.

The evidence published by the revisionist

historians, when it was used to sustain this position,
helped to stimulate a strong sense of guilt in Britain.
These feelings, in turn, created the desire to make amends
for the harsh peace that they had helped to impose.
The link between the revisionist historians and the
events of March 7, 1936 did not go unnoticed.

The liberal

and literary weekly Christian Century, one of the most
influential Protestant publications, while searching for

39 Ibid ., p. 456.
40MGermany and France," Spectator, CLVI (March 27, 1936),
p. 564.
41Stephen Gwynn, "British Policy in the Crisis,"
Fortnightly, CXXIX (April, 1936), pp. 385-391.
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a means of reconciling its antipathy for Hitler with its
equally strong dislike of war, recognized that:
The whole Versailles program •.• rested upon the
ascription of the entire responsibility for the
war to Germany •••• Now if there is one thing
that has been more definitely proved than an
other about the World War it is that Germany
was not solely responsible for it. The pre
supposition underlying the terms of the Treaty
was false, Germany knows it, and everybody else
knows it.42
Once Versailles had been discredited, Christian Century did
not think other governments would be averse to Germany
overthrowing its restrictions. 43 Therefore, in spite of
the weekly's belief that the Nazi regime was far more danger
ous than any other, it did not consider it possible " ••• to
maintain defenses whose moral foundations have so completely
crumbled. 11 44 The only alternative remaining was to support
revision, the same untenable position of the Manchester
Guardian.

The issue of remilitarization had been resolved

for the moment; yet, it did not accurately represent either
the Guardian or the Christian Century's opinion of Nazi
Germany.

But revisionist history, by having provided evidence

which Germany could adopt to justify her desires for revoking
provisions of the Treaty, had been instrumental in producing
favorable press reaction to the disposition of the Rhineland.

4211Germany Invades the Rhineland," Christian Century,
LIII (March 18, 1936), p. 422~424.
43 Ibid •
44 Ibid •

CHAPTER VI
TEMPER OF THE TIMES
Britain's decision to avoid conflict while proceeding
with negotiations had been supported, almost without ex
ception, by the press and members of the National Government.
In addition, widespread acceptance of this policy also ex
isted within all segments of the intellectual community,
encompassing members of the aristocracy and clergy as well
as historians, journalists, academicians, and informed
citizen groups.

During this crisis, these various strands

of Britain's establishment achieved a consensus due in
part to the climate of opinion which the revisionist
historians had helped to prepare.
When the Cabinet looked at the mood of the country
in the (days immediately following Germany's march into the
Rhineland, it noted a variety of feelings.

There seemed

to be cautious optimism that Hitler would now be satisfied
with troops once more on the West bank of the Rhine.

German

peace proposals and a willingness to rejoin the League of
Nations further substantiated this mood of hope.

Yet there

was dismay over the FUhrer's techniques, along with anxiety
that France might try to precipitate an incident which could
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draw Britain into unwanted hostilities.

In the long run,

hopes of rebuilding the disturbed peace won out over fears
of a conflict, but the awkward dilemma of how to explain
Hitler's actions within the framework of eXisting inter
national law still had to be resolved.

One method which

became highly successful was to shift the blame away from
Germany and place it on the Treaty of Versailles, now
almost universally condemmed as unfair and responsible
for German revision.

This reason provided a convenient

context for rationalizing the gap Hitler's coup had rent
in the status quo, and "for many people Hitler's action
simply removed one of the major humiliations imposed by
the bankrupt Versailles Treaty.,,1
The policy Britain adopted indicated that the members
of government were well aware of the public's views regarding
the Rhineland.

Baldwin, in his conversation with M. Flandin,

had alluded to the country's reluctance to support France
in any military venture. 2 And Von Hoesch, the German
Ambassador, after a close study of the general temperament

1Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, pp. 102-104; Gannon,
The British Press and Germany, pp. 10,297; Charles Loch
Mowat, Britain Between the War: 1918-1940, (Boston: Beacon
Press, 11955J 1971).
2Jones, A Diary With Letters, p. 185; Middlemas and
Barnes, Baldwin: A BiographY, pp. 919-920.
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concluded that:
••• the so called 'man in the street' generally
takes the view that he does not care a damn if
the Germans occupy their own territory with
military forces, which is a thing all other
states do anyway. He has not the slightest
intention of getting himself involved and
possibly even allowing himself to be drawn
into these questions, and he is thoroughly
angry with the French •••• 3
Anthony Eden, the Cabinet official charged with implementing
foreign policy, accepted Baldwin's appraisal of the situation
and described his own impressions of the public derived from
a taxi ride to the Foreign Office on March 9.

After arriving

at his destination, Eden queried the driver about news of
remilitarization, to which the cab driver responded, "I
suppose Jerry can do what he likes in his own back garden,
can't he?,,4<

Impressed, Eden considered the reply representa

tive of the majority in Britain at the time, " ••• when once
convinced that no German attack on France or Belgium was
immediately intended.,,5

Eden wavered little from his

opinion, crediting the favorable reception given to the
temporizing action taken by the Locarno signatories to the
public's belief that Germany, in this instance, had a
reasonable case. 6
Throughout the crisis, Viscount Halifax worked closely

3Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography, p. 922.
4Eden , Facing the Dictators, p. 389.
5 Ibid •

6 Ibid., pp. 396,425Q
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with Eden and the Foreign Office, and as an older, more
distinguished and experienced statesman, accompanied the
Secretary in his conversations with the other Locarno
powers. 7 Halifax's reluctance to see Britain assume any
specific military commitment directed against Germany would,
Baldwin reasoned, restrain Eden from the temptation to take
stronger action.

The Lord Privy Seal's determination to

keep out of a conflict was strengthened by his friends
Lord Londonderry, Lord Lothian, and Geoffrey Dawson, who
insisted

on~~

position.u 8

•• the inherent if rough justice of Germany's
It was easy for Halifax to accept Lothian's

interpretation of the German action as

ll

walking into her

own garden" along with his view that the British people,
••• hypnotized by German propaganda about the
inequity of Versailles, and obsessed by feelings
of unreasoning guilt were only too willing to shrug
their shoulder at this gross violation of the
Treaty.9
Another important member of the Cabinet, Neville Chamberlain,
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Baldwin's eventual successor,
shared this appraisal of the country's mood.

In the March 12,

entry of his diary, Chamberlain recorded a talk with Flandin,

7Alan Campbell Johnson, Viscount Halifax, (New York:
Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941), pp. 396-397.
8 Ibid ., p. 394.
9Fredrick Edwin Smith, Halifax: The Life of Lord
Halifax, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965), pp. 350-351.
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emphasizing that public opinion here would not support

us in sanctions of any kind.'"'O
Even politicians who disagreed with the direction of
policy recognized, along with Churchill, that opinion
11
supported Germany at this time.
One of these men, Duff
Cooper, Secretary of War in Baldwin's Cabinet since 1935,
noted with some irony that less than a decade after the
war those who had been most outspoken during the fighting,
" ••• the keenest of spY-hunters and the most determined in
their oaths never to speak to a German again were precisely
the people who forgot the real crime of Germany most
QUiCkly.,,12

But Cooper had moved in the opposite direction,

and after hearing Hitler during a visit to Germany in 1933,
he began to speak out publicly against the Nazi regime.
Addressing a small meeting of the Junior Imperial League,
Cooper told them that IIGermany was preparing for war on a
scale and with enthusiasm unmatched in history.1I 13 Immedi
ately the press reacted with hostility to the warning, and
both Rothermere and Beaverbrook denounced Cooper in scathing

10Keith Feiling, The Life of Nevile Chamberlain, (London:
MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1946), p. 279.
11Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 196-197.
12
Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, (New York: E. P. Dutton
and Co., Inc., 1954), p. 195.
13 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
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language, calling him a war-monger and his speech irresponsi
ble, jeopardizing the peace. 14 The foresight of Cooper,
, Churchill, and a few others who comprehended the true
nature of the Nazi regime could not alter the large body
of pro-German feeling that had grown up since the war.
Harold MacMillan, observing the situation from the
Tory backbench in the 1930's recognized the influence these
attitudes posed for diplomatic relations with Germany.
When Hitler entered the Rhineland, MacMillan commented often
about the uncertainty and confusion of the British who had
accepted Lord Lothain's phrase "into their own back-gardens"
as the correct interpretation of events.

Opinions like

these reduced the issue to a "minor, almost trivial event"
and blinded people to the true, critical nature of Hitler's
move which " •.• started the avalanche destined to engulf, in
its devasting path, the whole world.,,1 5
Hitler's entry into the Rhineland provoked much con
cern and discussion, not only among politicians, but within
all segments of the intellectual community.

One portion of

the British establishment, the clergy, pressured the Govern
ment into continuing to appease Germany.

The Canon of

Liverpool became a leading figure in this movement, trying
to show that his anti-French and pro-German views were
14 Ibid., p. 182.
15MacMillan, Winds of Change, p. 427.
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shared by a great number of his fellow countrymen, "' ••• and
in a democracy such as ours, the Government was bound, in
forming policy, to take public opinion into account. ,,,16
But at the same time the Canon actively worked to create
the kind of opinion he wanted officials to listen to,
preaching the wickedness of resorting to any pressure
against Germany:
'To continue an enforcement of the spirit of
inequality upon Germany ~hundered the Cano~
is a proposal unworthy of our creed and of
our country. To renew an occupation of their
homeland is a proposal monstrous and unjusti
fiable.'17
Another church figure, the Bishop of London, also spoke in
behalf of Germany, eXhorting Britain not to refuse the
"olive-branch" offered by Hitler.

To give weight to this

plea, he recalled the errors made in the aftermath of the
First War; revenge had been a mistake because
The ordinary German people were kindly and
sensitive to kind treatment. We should have
taken Germany by the hand at the end of the
War, when she had thrown over the Kaiser and
the military caste.
Many historians joined the clergy in
lenient treatment in the present crisis.

~alling

for

In a letter to

The Times, G. W. Headlam welcomed Hitler's move as a

16 The Canon of Liverpool as quoted in Cooper, Old
Men Forget, p. 427.
17 Ibid ., p. 197.
18The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 7.
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chance to rebuild peace and happiness in Europe.

The

historian maintained that no one ever made himself or
anyone else happier by persisting in bearing a grudge, and
Headlam indicated the modifications he had made in earlier
works to exemplify this principle:
In any dispute it is very improbable that one
party is entirely to blame; try to realize
any fault, folly or mistake of your own, admit
it to yourself and others •••• 19
Therefore, he concluded, remilitarization must be thought
of as a real opportunity for statesmanship to make an
alliance between Britain, France, and Germany.
The American historian Allan Nevins asked if the
incident was really such a calamity, and claimed that
British and even French opinion considered Germany's
garrisoning the Rhineland inevitable.

In this article,

Nevins did deplore the methods used, but then argued that
"no treaty ever endures long unless its signers believe it
to be eQUitable •••• ,,20

But such had not been the case

regarding Versailles, he asserted.

Nevins hoped that

Hitler's various offers would give Europe the opportunity
to build anew.

Even R. W. Seton-Watson, a supporter of

Serbian innocence against the claims of Sidney B. Fay and
Edith Durham, wrote to congratulate the Government and

19 The Times (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15.
20Allan NeVins, "Defiance on the Rhine,1I Current
History, XLIV (April, 1936), pp. 56-57.
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Foreign Secretary " ••• on having kept their heads, combined
firmness with conciliation, rejected the idea of sanctions
against Germany ••• and so maintained a certain mediatory
position.,,21

Another influential historian, Arnold TOYnbee,

openly eXhibited his sympathy for Germany.

On March 8,

during a walk with Tom Jones, Toynbee discussed his recent
trip to Germany where he became convinced of the sincerity
behind Hitler's desire for peace in Europe and close
friendship with England. 22 In the Survey of International
Affairs that Toynbee produced each year for The Royal
Institute of International Affairs, he mentioned the
importance pro-German attitudes had for influencing
Government policies.

According to Toynbee, the British

were willing to tolerate appeasement of the Rhineland
because of sympathy " •.• with German grievances against the
peace settlement and with the German struggle to regain
equality of status •••• ,,23

It is true, he agreed, Nazi

excesses during the last few years had shaken this sympathy,
but they had not destroyed " ••• the feeling that Germany had
not had a fair deal ••• and in the existing circumstances
there were many Englishmen who could find some excuse for

21 R• W. Seton-Watson, "The German Dilemma," Fortnightly,
CXXXIX (May, 1936), pp. 519-530.
22Jones, A Diary with Letters, p. 181.
23Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs,
1936, (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 276-277.

79
Germany's action on the 7~ March. 1I24

Edward Hallet Carr,

a British diplomatic historian and Bernadotte Everly Schmitt,
the American revisionist, when analyzing the thirties at
the end of the decade, agreed that a large body of opinion
did exist which considered the Versailles Treaty unjust
and thought it only fair that Germany should be given a
chance to rectify these grievances. 25
Journalists, another influential segment of the
British establishment, joined in attacking the Treaty and
called upon their country to redress its unfairness. Two
articles appearing in the English Review illustrate this
recurrent theme:
••• widespread pro-German sentiment based on an
appreciation of the unfairness of the Versailles
Treaty and admiration for the remarkable efforts
26
by which Germany has achieved her own regeneration.
Another even more explicit account in The Nineteenth Century
attacked Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty as inequitable
and labeled demilitarization an indefensible proposition. 27
Hitler emerged as the hero; only he had made the first real
attempt since 1919 to restore normal conditions to Europe.

24Ibid.
25Edward Hallett Carr. The Twent Year's Crisis 1919-193,
Harper Torchbook (New Yorki Harper and Row, 19 4 , p. 281;
Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, From Versailles to Munich, pp. 16-17.
26Wilfrid Hingle, "Revision of Versailles," The English
Review, LXII (May, 1936), p. 523; E. :D. O'Brien, "Germany Looks
Outwards," The English Review, LXIII (October, 1936), p. 345.
27William H. Dawson, "Hitler's Challenge," The Nineteenth
Century, XCIX (April, 1936), pp. 403-404.
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Moreover, now that Germany has won back her

11 • • •

independ

ence, self-respect, and honour as a Sovereign State, men
of good will ought not to trouble over much about 'ways
28
and means.'"
Letters people wrote to the press served as another
form for indicating how widespread feelings against the
Treaty had become.

One, carried by The Spectator, asked

the Allies to completely discard the "ill-fated Treaty of
Versailles" because pUblic opinion in England was so
divided.

The common people had an uneasy conscience toward

Germany and no united front to stop Hitler could be rallied.
Therefore, the public must be shown that Germany had been
fairly treated first; then, if she strayed beyond the
acceptable bounds of a new settlement, the Government could
find support in mOVing against her. 29 Other letters

28 Ibid • For more articles in the same vein also see:
"The Outl~" The Contemporary Review, CXLIX (April, 1936),
p. 385; Charles Hobhouse, "International Disorder," The
Contemporary ReView, CXLIX (May, 1936), p. 513; George
Glasgow, I'Fore ign Affairs, Il The contemyorary Review, CXLIX
(April, 1936), pp. 485-496; (May, 1936 , pp. 613-624; T. P.
Conwell-Evens, "Germany in JUly-August," The Nineteenth
Century, CXX (October, 1936), pp. 418-419; and "Between
Berlin and London," The Nineteenth Century, CXIX (January,
1936), pp. 57-79; H. N. Brailsford, "Britain Drifts Towards
Hi tIer," The New Republic, LXXXVII (June 3, 1936), pp. 92-94;
"Recovery of lihe Rhineland," Review of Reviews, XCII (April,
1936), p •. 66; liThe World Over," The Living Age, CCCL (May,
1936), pp. 189-191; and many others too numerous to mention.
29H• Powys Greenwood, "Germany's Claim," The Spectator,
CLVI (March 20, 1936), pp. 516-517.
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sustained the impression that most people refused to see
any harm in German violations of an already discredited

Treaty; consequently, Britain should not promise too much
support to France. 30 In fact, letters to the editor of
The Times ran so overwhelmingly in favor of Germany, it
caused Barrington-Ward to compain to Ambassador Joseph
Kennedy about the newspaper's difficulty in finding enough
letters stating anti-German views in order to balance the
correspondence. 31
There were other, informal, but no less important
expressions of sympathy for Germany emanating from aristo
cratic circles.
quoted

wee~nd

One of these occurred at a famous and much
at Blickling, Lord Lothian's home.

On March

7, 1936, he hosted a number of people, some of whom were
part of the "Cliveden Set. 1I

According to Tom:· Jones,

secretary and close personal associate to Lloyd-George and
then to Baldwin, those who composed Cliveden had considerable
social and political impact. 32 Others have disputed the
group's influence, asserting that regardless of the social
status of those who dined with the Astors, they were
responsible for very little; the disposition to appease
was already Widespread, and it did not need these affairs

30The Times (London), March 9, 1936, p. 15.
31'Gannon, The British Press, p. 99.
32Jones, Diary With Letters, pp. xxxiv-xi.
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to reinforce it. 33
These disputes aside, there is one thing revealed
by those who attended the week-end at Lord Lothian's: the
depth to which pro-German sympathy had permeated the British
upper classes.

The guests at Blickling included: Mr. and

Mrs. Norman Davis, former United States Ambassador in
London; Mr. and Mrs. Vincent Massey, Canadian High
Commissioner in London, and subsequently Governor-General
of Canada; Lord and Lady Astor; Sir Thomas and Lady Inskip,
subsequently Lord Caldecote, and first Minister of Defense
in Baldwin's Cabinet; Sir Walter and Lady Layton, Chairman
of the News Chronicle-Star; Arnold Toynbee, historian and
Director of the Studies at Chatham House, 1925-1955; and
Tom Jones. 34 The guests, after listening to the news of
Hitler's entry into the Rhineland on the wireless, followed
Jones' suggestion to resolve themselves into a "Shadow
Cabinet. 1I

They then drew up a set of eight conclusions

which they phoned into the Prime Minister.

Generally the

tone of these recommendations was conciliatory, and the
first proposed welcoming Hitler's declaration whole
heartedly.35

The next two, reflecting current opinion,

33Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, p. 46.
34Jones, A Diary With Letters, p. 179.
35 Ibid •
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asked that the breach of Part V of the Treaty be treated
as " ••• relatively de minimus: and not to be taken tragically
in view of the peace proposals which accompany it.
Versailles is now a corpse and should be buried.,,36

The

recommendations also stated that entrance to the zone should
be treated as an assertion, or demonstration of recovered
status of equality, and not as an act of aggression. 37 Jones
hoped these suggestions would help the Prime Minister make
up his mind about what course to take before he entered the
Cabinet meeting and faced contradictory advice.

Raldwin's

secretary believed in the correctness of this council, con
vinced " ••• the English would not dream of going to war
because German troops had marched into their own territories-

w~atever Treaties had been declared.,,38

Assessing the impact

of the 'Shadow Cabinet's' role in determining what policy
would be implemented, one author called it "unofficial but
highly influential.,,39

Moreover, since Jones was Deputy

Secretary of the real Cabinet at this time, " ••• he added
the considerable weight of his own authority and his own
influence on the Prime Minister.,,40

A. L. Rowse has made

36Jones, A Diary With Letters, p. 179.
37 Ib id., p. 181.
38 Ibid •
39Connell, The 'Office', p. 229.
40 Ibid •
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a description of the closeness of this relationship between
the two men:

••• to Baldwin T. J. incarnated the Wisdom of the
ages! Baldwin ceased to listen to Vansittart
whose warnings were so uncomfortable and pre
ferred T. J. whose siren voice contributed the
more soothing passages to his speeches.41
Whether, in fact, the group at Blickling determined British
policy in this crisis is debatable.

But there is no question

that b¥ apprising the Prime Minister of the conclusions
reached over the week.end, they helped confirm his opinion
of the country's mood, further convincing Baldwin that
little toleration for aiding France existed on this issue.
Although the events at Lord Lothian's attracted much
notoriety, there were other instances when members of the
establishment spoke out in favor of appeasement.

For example,

the Executive Committee of the "Council of Action for Peace
and Reconstruction" passed a resolution at the March 11
meeting at Abbey House which regreted the German action,
welcomed Eden's declaration that the Government would examine
Hitler's peace proposals, repudiated the idea of sanctions
against Germany, called on the Government to open discussions
with Hitler and other powers through the League in order
to obtain German re-entry, and asked for negotiation of a
general European Pact of non-aggression. 42 Chairing this

41Rowse, Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline,
pp. 35-37.
42 The Times (London), March 12, 1936, p. 8.
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meeting was David Lloyd-George, and among the members in
attendance were Lady Snowden; Miss Eleanor Rathbone, MP;
Drs. F. W. Norwood and S. M. Berry; and Sir Edgar Jones: a
cross section of British society.
It is hard to tell how many people who fell under
the spell of appeasement had been convinced by reading the
findings of the revisionist historians.

One can say with

more certainty that the list of those who took a lenient
attitude toward Germany in 1936 was long, and it included
members from all ranks of British life.

By the end of the

thirties, after appeasement had lost a great deal of its
appeal and prestige, the mood would be far different.

But

in 1936, the country would not stand for anything that
might lead to war: "On all sides one hears sympathy for
Germany. ,,43

At this time, there was no doubt that a

large reservoir of compassion for the plight of Germany
existed.

And it was official estimates of the depth of

public opinion over the question of remilitarization which
helped to determine the form British policy took in coping
with Hitler's challenge in the Rhineland.

43Nicolson, Diaries and Letter~! 1930-1939, pp. 248-250.

CONCLUSION
Delving into the motives underlying appeasement,
Margaret George, author of a monograph on foreign policy,
offers two explanations for its creation: the horror of
war which had produced an overwhelming desire for pacifism,
and a mounting sympathy for Germany " ••• directly attributable
to the half-shamed awareness that the 'guilt verdict' of
the Versailles Treaty, and the post-war punishment of Germany
had been less than fair ••• to a German people who assuredly
could not be stigmatized with criminal responsibility for
the Great War.,,1

But even though she recognized the link

between pro-German sentiment and appeasement, the author
failed to uncover where or how this feeling originated.
Since only a few years earlier Germany had been considered
Britain's antagonist in a World War, there needs to be a
satisfactory account for this reversal of attitudes.

Thus,

while this paper has focused on the influence of the
revisionist historians during the inter-war period in Britain,
the relationship between their findings and the development

1Margaret George, The War ed Vision: British Forei n
Policy, 1933-1939, (Pittsburg: niversity of Pittsburgh
Press, 1965), p. xvi.
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of appeasement cannot be ignored.

It was their demonstration

that provided a necessary moral and ethical framework in
which a new foreign policy could be constructed.
Once Germany was no longer the enemy, British
interests demanded that conditions on the continent return
to normal as soon as possible.

This implied a Germany

established on an equal footing with the rest of the nations
of Europe.

Appeasement became the means through which

Britain could satisfy German demands while simultaneously
fulfilling her own goals.
There is no doubt that the revisionist historians
had a profound effect upon their times.

In fact, this

paper has proven it was their very success which made
maintenance of the V€rsialles Settlement so difficult.
Termination of the Treaty seemed the only solution.

And

whether this occurred by negotiation or flagrant breaches
of its provisions did not seem to matter enough for people
to go to war to defend what by 1936 had become indefensible.
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gave a clear view of the position of many prominent
members of Government and the arguments most frequently
used either in support or against official policy.
II.

Books and Pamphlets:

Amery, Leo S. The Unforgiving Years, 1929-1940. Vol. III of
My Political Life. 3 vols. London: Hutchinson and
Co. Ltd., 1955.
This book treats the period from 1929-1940 as
both an addition and a corrective to Sir Winston
Churchill's The Gathering Storm and Lord ~~mplewood~s
Nine Troubled Years. Amery tells the story of these
88
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years from his own personal angle and sees the real
end of the era occurring with the fall of the
Chamberlain Government. Only slightly helpful on
the crisis of remilitarization.
Asquith, Herbert Henry, Earl of OXford and Asquith. The
Genesis of the War. New York: George H. Doran Co.,

1923.

Asquith was Prime Minister of Great Britain
from 1908-1916, during the crucial years leading up
to the war. In this account, he covers European
diplomacy from 1888, giving particular emphasis to
Anglo-German relations and the immediate origins of
the war. Asquith presents the Allied version of
German war-guilt and discounts any new documentary
evidence.
Avon, Anthony Eden, Earl of. Facing the Dictators. Vol. II
of The Memoirs of AnthO~Y Eden, Earl of Avon. Boston:
Houghton Miflin Co., 19 2.
This volume covers the period when Eden was a
minister at the Foreign Office from the Autumn of 1931
until he resigned as Foreign Secretary in February,
1938. The chief sources Eden relied on have been
telegrams and dispatches recording missions and conver
sations, along with the minutes written on Foreign
Office papers to the Prime Minister when he was Foreign
Secretary. Eden has also included dispatches and
letters to ambassadors.
His account of the events leading up to remili
tarization and his response to it are detailed and
invaluable in understanding British foreign policy
toward Germany. Eden also gives some insight into
what motivated his decisions.
Barnes, Harry Elmer. The Genesis of the World War: An Intro
duction to the Problem of War Guilt. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf Inc., 1926.
In writing this revision of the origins of the
war, Barnes is explicitly relating the information to
the present world situation in an attempt to gain
revision of the Treaty. Thus, his discussion of the
long range and immediate causes is marred by his desire
to completely exonerate Germany. In doing so he
emphasizes the new documents available since the war,
and while they go a long way in shedding a new light
on the controversy, Barnes omits too many other facts
to be convincing.
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In Quest of Truth and Justice. National
Historical Society, 1928.
A follow-up to his earlier work, the book reads
more like a pamphlet. V€ry polemical in style, and
designed to be less scholarly than Barnes' earlier
book, it was devoted to refuting his critics and
popularizing the revisionists' ideas. A good discussion
of some of the other revisionist historians, although
subjective in nature.

Bergmann, Carl. The History of Reparations. London: Ernest
Berm, Ltd., 1927.
A thorough study of the entire reparations
issue up through 1925, Bergmann goes back to its
inception at the Peace Conference. This work tends
to accept the German propaganda claim that reparations
in its form and intent was based on Germany as a
criminal.
Birkenhead, Fredrick Edwin Smith, The Earl of. Halifax: The
Life of Lord Halifax. London: Hamish Hamilton~ 1965.
One of the most recent works on Halifax, making
use of newly available papers, particularly the
Hickleton Papers and Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1918-1944, (Series D). Also included in this account
were past works on Halifax plus his own autobiographical
information. A useful work and good discussion of
Halifax and the development of his ideas on foreign
policy.
Butler, James Ramsay Montagu. Lord Lothian, (Philip Kerr),
1882-191°. London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1960.
n this biography, the author, an admirer of
Lothian, writes in a generally favorable manner about
his subject. Butler makes use of letters and the
Lothian papers, and covers his life topically. A
useful work in gaining an understanding of Lothian's
pro-German views and how they developed.
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Year's Crisis
Harper Torch Books. New York: Harper and
1964.
In this work, Carr, a diplomatic historian,
analyzes international relations during the crucial
inter-war period. His emphasis in attempting to ex
plain the shortness of the peace was placed on the
illusions and reality of power in conducting foreign
policy. A good survey of the European scene, and the
failures to maintain the peace.
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Churchill, Sir Winston. The Gathering Storm. Vol. I of
The Second World War. 6 vola. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1948.
As part of a series on the Second World War,
Churchill covers the inter-war period. A good account
of the events during this time, particularly from the
point of view of someone in the opposition to many
government policies. He used material such as
memoranda, directives, personal telegrams and minutes
made while in and out of government, supplemented with
speeches given while in the House of Commons. Some
conclusions, however, seem to be based on historical
hindsight, but how much is uncertain.
Cochran, Michael Hermond. Germany Not Guilty in 1914. BOston:
The Stratfurd Co., 1931.
The author, an associate professor of history at
the University of Missouri, writes little more than a
diatribe against Bernadotte ScbmittJs book, criticizing
every single thing about it from his translations t use
of documents, logic, grammar, style and conclusions. A
venomous attack on Scbmitt and other I1 s alavagers." The
author is a supporter of Harry Elmer Barnes.
Connell, John ~ohn Henry Robertson~· 1he 'Office': The Story
of the British Forei~n Office, 1919-1951. New York:
st. Martin's Press, 958.
A well-narrated and clear account of foreign
policy, and also of the British Government's response
to remilitarization. There is some information on
the workings of the Foreign Office, but since no FO
documents are cited, there is nothing much new added
to what is already known by others who have written
about this period.
Cooper, Duff. Old Men Forget. New York: E. P. Dutton and
Co. Inc., 1954.
In this autobiography, Cooper covers his childhood,
education and political career. He makes a fairly
objective attempt at recapturing his past life and has
many useful observations of life among upper class
gentry in pre and post war England. Some helpful
insights about Anglo-German relations from one who did
not always agree with the direction of policy.
Craig, Gordon A., and Gilbert, Felix, eds. The Diplomats:
1919-1939. Atheneum Books. 2 vols. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953.
An excellent study of the foreign service of each
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major country in Europe and the diplomats who
represented them in the important capitals. Of
interest for this paper was Chapter XV in volume
lIon Hbrace Rumbold, Britain's Ambassador to
Germany when the Nazi regime came to power.
CUff, Samuel, H. The Face of War: 1931-1942. New York:
Julian Messner, Inc., 1942.
The author makes a narration of facts but
does not make any attempt to analyze them. The
book does include a series of helpfUl maps by
James McNaughton and Robert Bright.
Dalton, Hugh. The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-1945. Vol. II.
2 vols. London: Fredrick Muller Ltd., 1957.
Dalton takes most of his material from his
diaries. His emphasis is not general history but
rather what he knew about the events occurring in
his own time. The book tended to act chiefly as a
vindication of his own policy.
Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. The International Anarchy,
.
1904-1914. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1926.
This British historian presents one important
revisionist thesis, that the war was caused not by
any one nation or group of nations but by certain
pre-conditions existing between states: when these
conditions are present, then war must follow. The
purpose of the book is also explicitly stated by the
author, to prevent another war, and he uses the First
World War as an example.
A very persuasive analysis, mainly on the long
range causes which effectively places responsibility
upon all of the nations of Europe.
Durham, Mary Edith. The Serajevo Crime. London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1925.
The emphasis of this book is the Balkans and
Serbian history. The purpose of the monograph is to
demonstrate Serbian guilt and Austrian innocence.
Although Miss Durham uses many facts previously
unavailable to build her case, she sometimes loses
objectiVity and does not present both sides. The
book did further the revisionist cause however, and
supported Fay's work on the same topic.
Ebray, Alcide. A Frenchman Looks at the Peace. Translated
by E. W. Dickes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.
Another revisionist work by a French historian,
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Ebray sees almost all the nations guilty and war
practically inevitable, given the circumstances in
1914. The author spends much time in linking
revisionist findings to the Treaty in an attempt to
discredit it or to have certain provisions rewritten
in the light of new historical evidence. His obvious
didactic purpose for writing the book makes the
reader suspect the author's objectivity in presenting
his evidence.
Fabre-Luce, Alfred. The Limitations of Victory. Translated
by Constance Vesey. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.
Another French historian writes a clearly
revisionist work, seeing a general European responsi
bility for the war, although he does blame Germany
in large measure because she had introduced the cult
of militarism and the 'might makes right' philosophy
into European political circles. The monograph is
divided into three parts: the long range causes,
immediate causes, and the aftermath. Here the author
takes the opportunity to attack the peace because it
ensued from a poor Treaty.
Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. The Origins of the World War. 2 vols.
2nd. ed. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1928.
Fay, a professor of history at Harvard University,
wrote one of the most influential of the revisionist
works. Volume I covers the long range causes which he
classifies into five categories. Here Fay is very
good in discussing the implications of these causes
for the origins of the war. Fay also develops the
Balkan situation, concentrating on the period from
1870-1914.
In Volume II Fay discusses the immediate causes
of the war from the assa8sination of the Arch-Duke
until war is declared. Here Fay tends to become
didactic and to lose a degree of objectivity in
assigning blame to others.
Feiling, Keith. The Life of Neville Chamberlain. London:
MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1946.
Feiling is the official biographer of Chamberlain,
and had access to all of his papers. He also consulted
contemporaries who knew him, as well as using large
quantities of letters to two sisters which revealed
many of Chamberlain's thoughts on issues. Feiling
was unable to make use of the material in the British
archives which had not yet been opened when the book
was published.
Gannon, Franklin, Reid. The British Press and Germany: 1936
1939. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
An excellent analysis of the British Press's
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position on the critical issue of Germany, this work
proved very belpful in describing the role of the
press in regard to British public opinion.
George, Margaret. The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy,
1933-1939. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1965.
The author proposes to discuss the motivation
for appeasement, not merely to describe it. She limits
her analysis to the Conservative Party. The monograph
was not particularly helpful, merely repeating what
others have already written about the topic.
Gilbert) Martin. The Roots of Appeasement. London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1966.
The author, a Fellow of Merton College, Oxford,
has written a number of books on Modern Europe, Britain,
and the inter-war years. In this excellent monograph,
Gilbert traces the growth of appeasement from 1919
through Munich as a factor operating in shaping
public opinion and official policy. He also examines
influences creating the policy of appeasement, and
he gives a good short section on the revisionist
historians. This book was very useful and had an
excellent bibliography for future study in the area.
______~~~-; and Gott, Richard. The Appeasers. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.
The emphasis in tbis book is on the men who
carried forth the policy of appeasement in Britain,
especially after 1937 when Chamberlain succeeded
Baldwin. These men are portrayed as blind, secretive,
and willing to ignore all facts in an effort to pro
mote their policies. The authors provide a good
bibliography, and a short but useful biographical
section.
Gooch, George Peabody. Recent Revelations of European
Diplomac
London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927.
T is work, by the well-known British historian,
is largely an extended bibliographic essay which
analyzes the major works of the period preceding the
World War, and their effects on the interpretations
of the origins of the war. He looks at the most
current materials as well, ranging from archival
sources, biographies, manuscripts, and documents
available from Germany, Austria, Russia, and the
Near East, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and

h.
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the United States. An invaluable aid to a complete
study of the evidence with an objective evaluation.
Granzow, Brigitte. A Mirror of Nazism: British Opinion and
the Emergence of Hitler, 1929-1933. London: Victor
Gollancz Ltd., 1964.
This monograph proposes a critical study of
the British newspaper opinion and focuses on events
happening in Germany at the time. The work is fairly
limited to only a few of the papers, The Times (London)
the Observer, the Manchester Guardian, the Daily
Telegraph, and the Economist. Only moderately helpful
in the preparation of this thesis.
Graves, Robert, and Hodge, Alan. ~T~h~e~L~o~n~g~~~~~~~
Social Histor of Great Britain
York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1940, 1963.
A thoroughly entertaining, widely ranging
discussion of British social, artistic, intellectual,
and political life during the inter-war years.
Generally narrative rather than analytical account
of the times, the authors have covered a vast quantity
of material.
Halifax, Edward Fredrick Lindley Wood, Earl of. Fulness of
Days. London: Collins, 1957.
The book covers mainly the Foreign Office from
1937 on and is not very helpful on either the Rhineland
crisis or on his philosophy of foreign policy.

______

Speeches on Foreign Policy. ed. H. H. E.
Craster. London: Oxford University Press, 1940.
A collection of speeches, beginning about 1934
and ending in 1940, compiled by a friend of Halifax's,
with the intention of showing the full scope of his
views on foreign policy.

-=~~.

Headlam, Sir James Wycliff, (Headlam-Morley). The History of
Twelve Days: July 24~ to August 4~ 1914. London: T.
Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1915.
The author, formerly a fellow of King's College,
Cambridge, has written an account of the negotiations
preceding the outbreak of war based upon the official
publicationsaYailable at the time. There is a
definite bias in favor of the Entente, and the author
does not waiver from the premise of German guilt.
This work is accepted as the standard version of how
the war began until the revisionist historians started
to publish their findings.
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Holborn, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945.
Vol. III of A History of Modern GermaAY.
3 vols.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
An excellent history of modern Germany through
its period of nationalism and imperialism. Very
helpful in giving the German point of view regarding
the Peace Settlement for this paper.
Johnson, Alan Campbell. Viscount Halifax. New York: Ives
Washburn Inc., 1941.
A highly favorable and popular biography of
Halifax, it was not meant to be an apologia.
Instead
the author tried to break down "the barrier of
anonymity" that stood between Halifax and a critical
estimate of the man. To do this Johnson combined
personal life with political background. This work
offered some aid in understanding Halifax's views
of appeasement and Germany.
Jones, Thomas. A Diary With Letters: 1931-1950. London:
Oxford University Press, 1954.
When he joined the War Cabinet Secretariat in
December, 1916, Jones began keeping a diary. This
pUblished version constitu~Bapproximatelyone sixth
of the original. An invaluable record of the times
and the men who helped shape them since Jones had
access and advisory relationships with four Prime
Ministers: Lloyd-George, Bonar Law, Baldwin, and
McDonald.
Keynes, John Maynard. A Revision of the Treaty. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922.
This work is a sequel to Keynes' famous book
The Economic Consequences of the Treaty. Here, the
author carries his economic observations one step
further and relates them to the need for Treaty
revision. A very persuasive discussion of the need
to alter certain provisions of the Treaty.
MacMillan, Harold. Winds of Change. Vol. I of Memoirs.
6 vols. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
Although MacMillan was never a member of any
administration until the 1940 Cabinet formed by
Churchill, as a backbencher during the inter-war
years he watched the development of events. He knew
many of the leading figures and took some part in
most of the great controversies; thus, his work is
important to an understanding of the formulation of
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policy. MacMillan pays particu~ar notice to the
impact of revisionist historians on Anglo-German
relations, discussing this at some length.
Medlicott, William N. British Foreign Policy Since
Versailles. London: Methuen and Co., 1940.
This is a survey of the fundamental policies
of Britain since Versailles. A small but concise
book, it deals with basic policies and methods for
implementing them. Medlicott provides a valuable
discussion and a good bibliography at the end.
•

Britain and Germany: The Searcb for Agreement,

------~1=9=3=O--1937. University of London: The Athlone Press,

1969.

This study grew out of the Creighton Lecture in
History, 1968, and the author is Emeritus Professor
of International History at the University of London.
He offers a very brief discussion of British attempts
to corne to terms with Germany, and the reasons for
failure. The main emphasis of the book rests with
the role of the foreign office.
Middlemas, Keith, and Barnes, John. Baldwin: A Biograp~y.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
In this lengthy work, there is an attempt to
rehabilitate Baldwin. The authors use many private
papers, Baldwin's own private papers, memoirs of his
contemporaries, plus the whole range of Cabinet
papers and departmental archives from 1922-1937.
MUch useful information on the formulation and
execution of policy is provided for this paper.
Max, Count. The Case for the Central Powers: An
Impeachment of the Versailles Verdict. Translated by
Constance Vesey. London: George Allen and Unwin.,

Montg~las,

1925.

The author is also co-editor of the German
documents pertaining to the outbreak of war known
as the Kautsky Documents. In this work he attempts
not only to remove any guilt from the Central Powers
but to indict the Entente Powers for major responsibility
in bringing about war both as to long range and
immediate causes. The book is heavily didactic, the
purpose being to get the Treaty revised. This is
not a very objective study of the available material.
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Mowat, Charles Loch. B~itain Between tbe Wars: 1918-1940.
Boston: Beacon Press, (1955), 1971.
Mowat provides an analysis of the inter-war
years covering domestic, social, economic, political
and diplomatic bistory. A useful survey of the
period. He dismissed simple ste~eotypes of Tories
and lapsed Labourites who led Britain into World War
II, making a less sinister interpretation of England's
leaders during this time. Basically this can be
considered a text book.
Muggeridge, Malcolm. The Thirties: 1930-1940 in G~eat
Britain. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940.
In form, this work resembles a social history,
and it is full of comments on life and society in the
tbirties, ranging from politics, cinema, economics
and literature. Of some aid in understanding the
tone and temper of the period.
Nicolson, Harold. Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939. Vol. II
of The Diaries and Letters of Harold Nicolson. Edited
by Nigel Nicolson. 3 vols. New York: Atheneum, 1966.
An absorbing andvaluable record of the thoughts
and mood of the people in power. Nicolson knew many
of the members of the ruling class in Britain. As
part of the establishment himself and a careful
observer of his times, he has left a fascinating
account of the inter-war years. Very good on public
and official reaction to Hitler's coup.
Oxford Pamphlets. 19 vols. London: Oxford University Press,
1914-1915.
A series of pamphlets, published at the outbreak
of war, they covered all aspects of the origins of the
conflict and the initial fighting. They appear to be
mainly propagandistic in nature and offer the British
case.
Poincare, Raymond. 'The Origins of the War. London: Cassell
and Co. Ltd., 1922.
Poincare traces Anglo-French relations from
1870, and discusses French policy with Russia, as well
as the "last efforts for peace," but the book frequent
ly fails to rise above the level of a validation of
his policies. Poincare~also discounts any attempts
at revision of the standard view of German war-guilt.
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Renouvin, Pierre. The Immediate Ori ins of the War 28 lli
June-4 11i Au ust 1914. Translated by Theodore Carswell
Hume. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928.
The French historian presents an excellent
summary of the steps leading up to war and examines
botb outward actions of each nation and motivation
as well. A balanced, reasoned, and moderate account.
Althougb a revisionist, Renouvin concludes ultimate
responsibility rested with the Central Powers.
This American edition was revised to incorporate
British documents published in late 1926.
Rowse, Alfred Leslie. Appeasement: A study in Political
Decline, 1933-1939. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Inc., 1961.
As a young man during this time, Rowse and a
few other members of All Souls became incensed as
they watched the establishment follow tbe course of
appeasement. Must of tbese supporters of appeasement
and of the National Government were linked together
tbrougb All Souls, and could exert tremendous
influence on policy in this way. A one-sided but
interesting argument.
Schmitt, Bernadotte Everly. The Coming of the War, 1914.
2 vols. New York: Cbarles Scribners Sons., 1930.
Although a revisionist historian, Schmitt does
not agree with Barnes' interpretation. Schmitt does
not see England as gUilty for the origins of tbe war
nor Grey a villain. In bis concentration on the
immediate causes, be portrays En~land as a victim of
circumstances.
•

From Versailles to Munich. (Public
Edited by Harry D. Gideonse.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 1938.
Schmitt makes an attempt to summarize European
affairs during the inter-war period, particularly
since the rise of Hitler. He picturs the democracies
as unwilling or unable to stop the continued successes
of Hitler and searches for the reasons for the weak,
vacillating policies that were followed.

-------=p-o~l~i-c-y-=P-am--phlet No. 28)~

Seaman, Lewis Charles Bernard. Life in Britain Between the
Wars. Part of English Life Series. Edited by Peter
Quennell. London: B. T. Bratsford Ltd., 1970.
This work is a survey of English life between
the wars with an emphasis on domestic and social
history. A broad, general account only slightly
helpful in determining the mood of the times.
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Temperley, Harold William, ed. A History of the Peace
Conference: The Settlement With Germany. Vol. II of
A History of the Peace Conference. 6 vols. London:
Henry Froude, Hodder and Stroughton, 1920.
In this second of the six volumes on the
Peace Conference, pUblished under the auspices of
the Institute of International Affairs, a thorough
examination of all aspects of the Treaty with
Germany is made. This includes the armistice, the
preliminary sessions, the conference itself, the
Treaty, interpretations of the articles by the Allies
and by the Germans, and the German reaction to the
Treaty. A complete, clear, and invaluable discussion
of the entire issue.
The Times (London). House of Commons, 1935. London: The
Times Office, 1935.
This publication contains the full results of
the election and polling with biographies of members
and unsuccessful candidates plus a complete analysis
and statistical tallies of the election. Somewhat
useful in examining the composition of the National
Government.
Thompson, Neville. The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition
to Appeasement in the 1930's. Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1971.
An excellent analysis of the growth of an anti
appeasement grouping during the thirties, the author
shows the discrepancy between the reality and what
people came to believe with historical hindsight. He
used memoirs, letters, and speeches to check into
claims of a consistent stand against appeasement. He
concluded that there was no real group until 1938, and
only small dissent prior to that. The bibliography
was excellent as well.
Toynbee, Arnold J. Survey of International ~ffairst 1936.
London: Oxford University Press, 1936.
Published yearly by the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, this account written by
Toynbee is a good reference to a chronological dis
cussion of the entire Rhineland issue.
Vansittart, Robert, Lord. The Mist Procession: The Autobi
ography of Lord Vansittart. London: Hutchinson and
Co. Ltd., 1958.
Always extremely anti-German, Vansittart uses
this opportunity to validate his position. There is
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little information on the workings of the Foreign
Office that was of use for this topic.
Ward, Sir A. W. and Gooch, George Peabody, eds. The Cambridge
History of British Foreign Policy. 1866-1919. Vol. III
of The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,
1783-1919. 3 vols. New York: MacMillan Co., 1923.
A thorough discussion of the entire period,
and a good standard account of the years prior to
the war.
Wegerer, Alfred von. A Refutation of the Versailles War
Guilt Thesis. Translated by Edwin H. Zeydel. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930.
The author, devoted to the cause of refuting
the war-guilt thesis and thus destroying the basis
upon which he believed the Treaty of Versailles to
be based, hoped to encourage peaceful revision of
the Treaty in order to forestall German revenge. His
thesis is that Germany was not guilty of precipitating
the war and all the evidence indicting her was merely
circumstantial, based upon incomplete or distorted
documents. Although he did present evidence showing
the involvement of Serbia, Austria, Russia, and France,
von Wegerer was less convincing when trying to
exonerate Germany.
Windrich, Elaine. British Labour's Foreign Policy. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1952.
The monograph covers the Labour Party's foreign
policy from the 1930's to the 1950's and tries to
prove there is a continuity in the policy. Somewhat
helpful to an understanding of the Party's views
toward Germany.
Wolfers, Arnold. Britain and France Between Two Wars:
Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940.
An excellent analysis of the inter-war years,
the author examines how Britain and France coped with
post-Versailles Europe, each holding a different
strategy for preserving the peace. Very helpfUl for
this paper, especially in the discussion of the legal
aspects of the Versailles Treaty.
Wrench, John Evelyn. Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times. London:
Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1955.
Not a particularly helpful work for this paper.
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It was largely a composition of Dawson's own diary
notes which tended to recount whom he met with and
when rather than elaborating on what was said.
III.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Alexander, Hbrace G. "Germany's Demand for Equality. ,. The
Spectator, CLIV (June 21, 1935), pp. 1058-1059. --
This article argues for recognition of German
equality and removal of the "war-guilt" clause.
Barnes, Harry Elmer. "Assessing the Blame for the World War:
A Revised Judgement Based on all the Available
Documents." Current History, XX (Hay, 1924), pp.
171-195.
Barnes presents his thesis that Germany is
not guilty and assigns responsibility in the following
order: Austria, Russia, France, Germany, and England.

-----r-:---.

"England Arraigns Herself. 1I The Nation, CXXV
(August 17, 1927), pp. 161-163.
While reviewing British Documents on the Origins
of the War, ed'. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley,
Barnes uses the opportunity to relate his theory of
English guilt, condemning Sir Arthur Nicolson and Eyre
Crowe for pushing Grey toward war.

___--==~. "Salvaging German War Guilt."

The New Republic,
LXIV (October 22, 1930), pp. 270-273.
Barnes reviews The Coming of the War, 1914 by
Bernadotte Schmitt, criticizing it as the last great
effort of the "salvagers" to select and interpret facts
in order to preserve pre-war theories. Barnes also
reviews The Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt
Thesis by Alfred von Wegerer, praising it as a careful
and lucid book which thoroughly destroys both Schmitt
and the Versailles thesis.

Beard, Charles A. lIHeroes and Villains of the World War."
"Current History, XXIV (August, 1926), pp. 730-735.
Beard evaluates the ideas of Harry Elmer
Barnes, agreeing with the need to revise the Versailles
war-guilt clause. But he rejects attempts to white-wash
German leaders.

______~~~~; Becker, Carl; Blakeslee, G. H.; Buell, Raymond
Leslie; Lingelbach, William E.; Morse, A. E.;
Schmitt, Bernadotte E.; Seymour, Charles; Wright,
Quincy. "Assessing the Blame. 1I Current History,
XX (June, 1924), pp. 452-462.
The editors of Current History submitted an
article by Harry Elmer Barnes to professors of history
at the chief American universities, all of whom were
recognized as experts. The majority of those who
commented had accepted, by 1924, at least part of the
revisionist argument, indicating how far these ideas
had progressed toward acceptance.
Beazley, Raymond C. "The Great Reversal. 1I The Christian
Century, XLIV (June 30, 1927), pp. 805-806.
The author presents a highly favorable review
of Harry Elmer Barnes' work, and calls his book
trustworthy and readable. He believes it will produce
a reversal of judgement which in time will change
the Treaty.
Binkley, R. C. "New Light on Russia's War Guilt. 1I Current
History, XXIII (January, 1926), pp. 531-533.
Binkley suggests three ways to view the origins
of the war, "guilt,1t "responsibility," and "cause."
He then produces a document from the Special Journal
of the Council of Ministers, 11 July 1914, from Russia,
to prove that her intentions were pacific and honorable.
_ _ _----",---;-~. "Revision of World War History.1t The Historical
Outlook, XIX (March, 1928), pp. 109-112.
Binkley claims that because of its involvement
with the Treaty, the issue of war origins cannot be
extricated from politics.
Brailsford, H. N. "Britain Drifts Towards Hitler." The New
Republic, LXXXVII (June 3, 1936), pp. 92-94.
The article discusses the division of the
British Cabinet and the Tory Party over the conduct
of foreign affairs: one school is headed by Churchill
and Austin Chamberlain and sees Germany as the future
enemy; and the other school, represented by Geoffrey
Dawson and Lord Lothian, regrets the follies of the
Versailles Pe~ce.
"British Opinion and British Policy. II The New Statesman and
Nation, XI (March 21, 1936), pp. 444-445.
This editorial attempts to explain the
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confusion of British people over German remilitarization
by attributing it to their feelings of guilt over
mistreatment of Germany at Versailles.
Cammaerts, Emile. "War Responsibility in 1914 and Today."
Edinburgh Review, CCXLI (January, 1925), pp. 38-55.
Even while finding merit with the traditional
interpretation of the origins of the war, Cammaerts
recognizes the political and diplomatic impact of
the issue because of its connection to the Treaty.
He claims the settlement of this question is vital
for the peace of Europe, and attempt.s to refute the
revisionists' findings.
Conwell-Evens, T. P. "Between Berlin and London." The
Nineteenth Century, CCXIX (January, 1936), pP:-57-59.
In an article highly favorable to rapprochement
between England and Germany the author sees this as
the best means of securinr European peace. He also
calls for appeasing Germany by revision of the Treaty.
_ _ _......,.,,.....-..-,-. "Germany in July-Au~ust." The Nineteenth
Century, CXX (October, 1936), pp. 409-419.
A very pro-German article in which the author
refers to a visit to Germany and lauds the great
domestic programs and Hitler's foreign policy.
Coolidge, Archibald Cary. "Dissatisfied Germany." Foreign
Affairs, IV (October, 1925), pp. 35-46.
An analysis of the effectiveness and scope of
the German propaganda effort since the signing of
the Treaty. Also the article tries to show the lack
of wisdom of basing the Treaty on the premise of
German responsibility for the war.
Dalton, Hugh. "The Present International System." The
Political Quarterly, VI (July, 1935), pp. 323-332.
Dalton presents a discussion of what Britain's
foreign policy ought to be according to Labour.
Dawson, William Harbutt. "Hitler's Challenge. 1I The Nineteenth
Century, CCXIX (April, 1936), pp. 401-416.
A tremendously pro-German article which calls
for complete revision in favor of Germany and welcomes
remilitarization as a step in that process. Also
extremely hostile remarks are made against . France.
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Delbruck, Hans. "Did the Kaiser Want the War?"
The
Contemporary Review, CXIX (March, 1921), pP:-322-345.
The writer tries to prove that even though
Germany legally declared war, it was the Russians
who really caused war by mobilizing her whole army
and fleet on July 30, and he supports the revisionist
position.
Demartial, Georges. "A Frenchman Lays Blame on France,
Russia, and England. 1I Current History, XXIII (March,
1926), PP. 787-793.
The author, an eminent French publicist and
exponent of the revisionist theory tries to prove
the French responsibility for the war.
Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. HAn Appeal to British Fair
Play. II The Nation and the Athena~um,XXXV (August 30,
1924), pp. 660-661.
.
This article by the British revisionist reviews
the German propaganda effort presented in a cleverly
worded pamphlet. Dickinson suggests that the charges
brought against Germany by the Allies were false; yet,
upon them the peace of Europe has been based and it
is a lie.
Durham, Mary Edith. TlCroatia and Great Serbia." Contemporary
Review, CXXIV (November, 1923), pp. 590-600.
The author presents her views about Serbian
guilt in bringing about the war.
•

"Fresh Light on Serbia and the War."

------~C-o-n~t-emporary Review, CXXIV (September, 1928), pp. 304-311.

In addition to crediting Serbia with the blame
for the whole affair, Durham also attacks Grey for
his failure to recognize Austrian justification for
the ultimatum.

Earle, Edward Mead. "A Wise and Upright Story of War
Responsibility." The New Republic, LVII (December
5, 1928), pp. 73-75.
A highly favorable review of Fay's Origins
of the World War, calling it well-researched,
scholarly, thoroughly documented, and courageous.
"England and France." The New Statesman, XXXII (November 24,
1928), pp. 216-217.
This article illustrates growing anti-French
sentiment and rising pro-German feelings.
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Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. "New Light on the Origins of the
World War." Part I American Historical Review, XY:.V
(July, 1920), pp. 616-639; Part II, L~VI (October,
1920), pp. 37-53; Part III, XXVI (January, 1921),
pp. 225-254.
In three separate issues, Fay developes his
ideas on the origins of the war which later appeared
in bis two volume work on this topic. In the first
article, Fay discusses the situation in 1914 and
German and Austrian methods of dealing with it,
emphasizing that the Kaiser and Bethmann were not
villains, merely simpletons.
In the second article, he maintains that
Germany made a real, if belated effort to induce
Austria to accept a peacefUl solution. Germany did
bave to accept responsibility for giving Austria a
free hand on July 5.
~he third article discusses Russia and the
other major powers, seeing Russian mobilization as
the direct cause of Germany's own.
•

"Serbia's Responsibility for the World War."

------~C-u-r-r-ent History, XXIII (October, 1925), pp. 41-48.

Recapitulation of his analysis of Serbian
guilt, later discussed in his book, is the theme of
this article. Fay credits the Serbian Government
with knowledge of the ~ssassination.

____~....---_. "Who Started the War?" The New Republic, XLV
(January 6, 1926), pp. 185-186.
In this very favorable review of an article
by Ex-Chancellor Marx, Fay agrees with his illustrations
of the Triple Entente's errors in helping to bring
about war.
_ _ _-----.-_ _ • "Serajevo Fifteen Years After." The LiviI1&
Age, CCCVI (July, 1929), pp. 374-379.
In discussing the events leading up to the
assassination, Fay concluded that Serbia must share
responsibility because there is evidence based on
explicit statements of the late M. Jovanvich that
M. Pashich, Serbian Prime Minister was aware of the
plot for several days.
•

"Pre-War Diplomacy and the Press."

Current

---~H~i-s~t-ory, XXXIII (November, 1930), pp. 212-217.

Fay blames the newspaper campaign against
Germany as a cause of war due to the quantity of
anti-German feeling and suspicion that was produced
which helped create and sustain tensions wbile

also poisoning the atmosphere.
IlForward. lI

New Statesman and Nation, VIII (September 29,

1934), pp. 415-419.

This article discusses Labour's foreign policy
in contrast to that of the Conservative Party.

Frantz, Gunther. IlDid Russian r1obilization Force War' in
1914? 'I Current History, XXV (March, 1929), pp.

852-858.

The author, a recognized authority on the issue
of the Russian role in bringing about the war, supports
the idea of mobilization by that country left Germany
no alternative but to declare war.

"Germany and France. lt The Spectator, CLVI (March 27,1936),
pp. 564-565.
In this editorial, the reoccupation of German
territory by German troops is seen as no reason for
war. There is already acceptance of remilitarization
as a fait accompli.
IIGermany Invades the Rhineland." The Christian Century, LIII
(March 18, 1936), p. 422.
Although hostile to Hitler, this journal's
editorial is forced to accede to remilitarization
because it sees the issue as tied to a Treaty which
is unjust and no longer a viable force in international
relations.
Glasgow, Geor~e. "Foreign Affairs. 1I The contemporary Review,
CXLIX (May, 1936), pp. 613-624.
In this article the author accepts Hitler's
argument that the Versailles Treaty is unjust. He
is only offended by German violations of the Locarno
Pact.
Gooch, George Peabody.. lILetter to the
War-Guilt. 'I The Nation and the
(September 16, 1922), p. 193.
Responding to an article
gUilt, Gooch claims it is lucid
written.

Editor--The Nyth of
Athenae:um,XXXI
on the myth of war
and dispassionately

Greenwood, H. Powys. "Germany's Claims," The Spectator,
CLVI (March 20, 1936), pp. 516-517.
This is a letter to the editor asking that the
Treaty of Versailles be disregarded in reference to
the Rhineland crisis.
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Gwynn, Stephen. "Bri tish Policy in the Cris is." The
Fortnightly Review, CXXIX (April, 1936), PP:-385-391.
Britain would not support France in challenging
Germany because of the peace proposals Hitler offered
and because this move constituted a "final repudiation
of 'war-guilt.'"
H. W. M.

liThe Question of Responsibility." The Nation and
the Athenaaum, XXX (October 29. 1921), pp. 171-173.
This author suggests that unless it can be
proven indisputably that Germany alone dug "the pit
into which she and the rest of the world fell," then
the Treaty of Versailles is based on a lie.
lIHerr Hitler and Versailles. lI The Spectator, CLIV (May 17,
1935), pp. 824-825.
This editorial indicates that there is a
growing movement for revision of certain provisions
of the Treaty.

Hingle, Wilfr id. "Revis ion of Versailles." The Engl ish
Review, LXII (May, 1936), p. 523.
The author calls for a thorough revision of
the Versailles Treaty in the wake of German remili
tarization. Also the article claims that a widespread
pro-German feeling is the product of recognition that
the Treaty was unfair.
Hobhouse, Sir Charles. "International Disorder." The
Contemporary Review, CXLIX (May, 1936), pp. 513-521.
The author supports the Locarno Pact but does
not mind that Germany has violated the Versailles
Treaty prOVisions.
Hoffman, M. M. HNultifold War Guilt. 1I The Commonweal, XII
(April 29, 1931), pp. 707-709.
An article that calls for revision of the
Treaty of Versailles, it points out the growing
popular demand for this both in England and America.
"Is There A Way To Peace?IT The New Statesman and Nation, XI
(March 14, 1936), pp. 372-373.
This editorial suggests that British public
opinion will accept remilitarization; it is only the
method used by Hitler that is offensive.
Kau tsky, Karl. IIGermany Since the War." Fore ign Affairs,
II (December 15, 1922), pp. 99-119.
Attacking the Treaty of Versailles in this
article, the author critisizes the basis upon which

it had been made. He says it is unfair to blame
the German people for tbe errors of a government
which they have already repudiated. Kautsky is
quite harsh on Article 231.
Max, Oount. "Letters to the Editor." The Nation,
OXXI (November 18, 1925), pp. 578-579.
Montgelas makes a favorable review of Pierre
Renouvin's book, calling it the !lsanest and most
up-to-date volume to come out of France."

Montg~las,

Mowat, Robert Balmain. "Great Britain and Germany in the
Early Twentieth Oentury." The English Historical
Review, XLVI (July, 1931), pp. 423-441.
In his analysis of the period prior to the
war, Mowat blames both sides for a failure to
arrive at a rapprochement which would have insured
the peace of Europe. He points out errors made by
Britain in a failure to be receptive on two oc
casions to German overtures for an Anglo-German
alliance, thereby sustaining revisionists' premises
that Germany alone, did not bring about the war.
Nevins, Allan. "Defiance on the Rhine." Ourrent History,
XLIV (April, 1936), pp. 56-57.
This historian asks if remilitarization is
really such a catastrophe and suggests that it is
only Hitler's methods which opinion cannot accept.
Moreover, no ,.treaty can endure unless its signers
believe it to be equitable.
Nevinson, Henry W. liThe Great Revision. 1I The Saturday
Review of Literature, III (November 20, 1926),
pp. 309-311
A highly favorable review of Harry Elmer Barnes'
book The Genesis of the World War is made by the author
who supports the view that Poincare and Sazonov are
the two chief villains of the war. He calls Barnes'
thesis both powerful and well-docv~ented.
Nicolson, Harold. "Has Britain a Policy?" Foreign Affairs,
XIV (July, 1936), pp. 549-562.
Nicolson indicates that in 1936 a strong wave
of pro-German feeling existed in England.
O'Brien, E. D. "Germany Looks Outwards." The English
Review, LXIII (October, 1936), p. 345.
An article in which the Treaty's unfairness
is attacked.
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Ratcliffe, S. K. "Ourselves and the New G'ermany."
Contemporary Review, CXLIV (September, 1933),
pp. 264-275.
In an article analyzing the Nazi revolution,
the author claims that one issue of Nazi propaganda
the IIwar-guilt lie,1I has found agreement among most
Englishmen. Furthermore, it was a serious mistake
on the part of those who wrote the Treaty.
llRecovery of the Rhineland." Review of Reviews, XCII (April,
1936), p. 66.
This editorial views remilitarization as quite
justified and part of a five step program in Germany's
return to independence.
Renouvin, Pierre. "How the War Came." Foreign Affairs,
VI (April, 1929), pp. 384-397.
The French historian gives a mixed review of
Fay's two volume work on The Origins of the War,
finding that his research into the immediate cause
of the war--the assassination--is excellent, but that
his conclusions are not always valid. On the other
hand, he criticizes Fay's work on a number of counts:
it has not yet obtained the absolute objectiveness
to which it aspires; and it is too critical of
France and Poincare.
Review of Reviews, LXXIX (January, 1929), p. 90.
A summary of Sidney ~ Fay's Origins of the
War is made, recognizing the significance of the
revisionist historian's work on international relations.
Schmitt, Bernadotte Everly.
"Triple. Alliance and Triple
Entente, 1902-1914." American Historical Review,
XXIX (April, 1924), pp. 449-473.
In a paper read at the December, 1923 meeting
of the American Historical Society, Schmitt presented
his views of the origins of the war. He stressed the
arms race and militarism as definite underlying
motives and pointed to both England and France's
responsibilities for the war. But in the last
analysis, Schmitt maintained that Germany must
assume a ~ajor share for the war.
____':"":""""__:-:'. IIA Distinguished American Historian Apportions
the War Guilt. 1I Current History, XXIII (March, 1926),
pp. 796-803.
While reviewing the article by Georges Demartial
in the same issue (see entry on Demartial) Schmitt
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suggests that although Germany is legally responsible
for the war, on the moral and political level new
documents can give other interpretations, among
these being the European system of alliances and
militarism. Schmitt concludes that responsibility
was divided.

., July, 1914." Fore ign Affairs, V (October,
1926), pp. 132-147.
In this article Schmitt reviews seven books
covering the origins of the war, ranging from
standard interpretations by Grey and Poincare to
those of revisionists such as Dickinson, Durham,
and Barnes.

----~";:;7"~.

•

"Where Does the Guilt Lie?"

------~R-e-v~i-ew of Literature, III (November

The Saturday
20, 1926),

pp. 311-312.
/
In a review of Poincare's memoirs, Schmitt
supports the idea of divided responsibility for the
war; France, Russia, and Germany are all gUilty to
some degree.
...
"Diplomatic Europe." The Saturday Review of
Literature, V (March 2, 1929), pp. 721-72b.
Schmitt gives a highly favorable review of
Fay's two volume work, seeing it as a well-written,
thorough, and masterly analysis. Schmitt does differ
from Fay in assigning to Germany a larger share of
the responsibility for the outbreak of war.
•

"The Origins of the War." The Journal of
1929), pp. 112-119.
A review of Fay's book in which Scrunitt
indicates the ways he differs from Fay over
apportioning the blame to Germany.

-------M~o~d-e-rn History, I (March,

Seton-\'latson, R. W. "The German Dilemma." The Fortnightly
Review, CXXXIX (May, 1936), pp. 319-330.
Congratulations are made by the author to the
British Government and the Foreign Secretary for
having kept their heads in the crisis. He dismisses
Versailles as having been signed under duress; therefore,
a certain plausible case could be made for violations
of its prOVisions.
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Seymour, Charles. "Questions of War Responsibility. 11
Yale Review, XIII (July, 1924), pp. 790-794.
In his review of three books on the war,
Seymour suggests that what have become known as the
Kautsky documents show Germany was not a villain,
and although willing to support Austria, was not
anxious for a general war.
Temperley, Harold. I'The Coming of the War." Foreigh Affairs,
IX (January, 1931), pp. 317-338.
This is a generally favorable review of'books
by revisionists such as Fay, Schmitt, Renouvin, and
others. Temperley sees Renouvin as the most impartial,
but suggests that Fay and Schmitt are lenient with
the Central Powers.
•

"The Archbishop and the Treaty.1I New Statesman
2, 1932), p. 417.
This article contains a discussion of Article
231, how it came to be misinterpreted by the Germans
at the Peace Conference, and the effects on international
relations and reparations.

--------a-n~d-=Nation, III (April

"The Blunder and the Way Out." The Nation, XXVI (February
14, 1920), pp. 661-662.
An early editorial in a major journal called
for a revision of the Treaty because it was vindictive
and could not be enforced.
"The German Challenge." The Spectator, CLVI (March 13, 1936),
pp. 4-56-457.
In this editorial the remilitarization of the
Rhineland is seen as a small thing, and Versailles
is discounted as a dead issue.
The New Statesman, XXVI (October 17, 1925), p. 100.
An editorial in this periodical ~efers to the
Treaty of Versailles as morally a II scrap of paper"
because it does not have the support of even a
majority of its signatories.
"The Responsibility for the War. 1I The New Statesman, XXV
(October 31, 1925), pp. 684-685.
Although this journal admits that Germany is
not solely responsible for the war, nevertheless she
is mainly at fault. The article does indicate that
by 1925 there was a large body of opinion ready to
accept the reYlsionist theories.
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The Times (London), March 7, 1936-March 31, 1936.
No study of this period could be made without
information found in this most influential of British
papers. Not only did its editorials reflect the
Government's position on many issues, its editorials
set a pace and tone for molding public opinion.
"The Week-End Review." New Statesman and Nation, CCCLXVII
(March 14, 1936), p. 367.
There is little doubt, according to this
article, that while the British public deplored
Hitler's methods it accepted his right to be in
the Rhineland.
"The World Over." The Living Age, CCCL (May, 1936), pp.
189-191.
This article sees the mild official and public
response to remilitarization as part of a definite
pro-German bias.
"Two

Ap~eals

for International Decency." The Nation, CXXII
(April 28, 1926), pp. 485-486.
Sponsored by Gilbert Murray, these two appeals
were made in behalf of reconsidering Article 231 and
Articles 227 to 230 of the Versailles Treaty. These
documents were first signed by over one hundred
Frenchmen and then many well-known Englishmen, among
them a number of revisionist historians.

I'War-Guilt My ths, II The Living Age, CCCXV (October 28,
1922), pp. 218-222.
In an editorial discussing an article appearing
the preVious month in The Nation and the Atheneum
the Whole issue of revisionist interpretations is
discussed and the connection between the historians'
findings and the "whole foundation of the Versailles
settlement" is made.
Waugh, Alec. "History Text Books as a Factor in International
Relations." International Affairs, XV (November,
1936), pp. 877-896.
In an address first presented at the March 26,
1936 meeting at Chatham House, the author developed
the idea that history books have made some impact
on international relations by shaping public opinion
on certain issues. He cited the revisionist
historians' findings about the First War to exemplify
this premise.
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Wegerer, Alfred von. I1The Evidence Challenged." Current
History, XXVIII (August, 1928), pp. 810-819.
The author concludes that from the evidence
available to those at Versailles charged with
establishing responsibility for the war no fair
conclusions could be drawn because the documents
were faulty, abridged, and full of omissions.
"A Tragic Scoop: The Premature Mobilization
Report in Germany.fI The Living Age, XXXIV (July 15,
1922), pp. 138-141.
Another attempt by von Wegerer to popularize
the German propaganda effort aimed at discrediting
the Treaty.

_ _ _---=-_ _ •

Woolf, Leonard. "Labourfs Foreign Policy.1I Political
Quarterly, IV (October, 1933), pp. 504-524.
Woolf sees the Labour Party's policies,
stated by Arthur Henderson, as inadequate to deal
wi th the Fasc is t po\'rers who do not share its desire
either for the League or peace.
IV,

Unpublished Materials:

Goldman, Aaron, L. IICrisis in the Rhineland: Britain,
France and the Rhineland. 11 Unpublished Ph. D.
dissertation, Indiana University, 1967.
Although the author discusses events both
prior to and succeeding the crisis in the Rhineland
with an examination of British and French roles
and their relationship with each other, for the
purpose of the paper it was of little help. The
impact of the revisionists was never considered,
and the study was not very analytical.

